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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C. 
Plaintiff, Counterclaim 
Defendant, and Appellee 
vs. 
EVAN O. ROLLER, 
Defendant, Counterclaimant, 
and Appellant. 
Case No. 960590-CA 
(Priority No. 10) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT EVAN O. ROLLER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2-2(3)(j), the Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to 
the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court had previously considered and accepted 
Appellant's Petition for Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order in Case No. 930-019, 
First District Court for Cache County, Utah. The Supreme Court received the Docketing 
Statement. The Supreme Court case number is 960162. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the Trial Court err in summarily holding Roller could not prevail on 
malpractice issues? 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law. This Court need not defer to the ruling 
of the lower Court, but should review it for correctness. Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 
827 P.2d 212, 217-218 (Utah 1992). Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 56(c). In reviewing Summary Judgment, the facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are to be reviewed in a light most favorable 
to the non-moving party. Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 954 (Utah 
1992); Winepar v. Froei Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). 
2. Was it an abuse of discretion to grant Partial Summary Judgment dismissing 
a malpractice Counterclaim because Defendant did not have an expert before discovery was 
completed? 
Standard_pf Review: Rule 37, U.R.C. Procedure contemplates dismissal of a 
claim only after a discovery order is refused. Much later chances to get the expert were 
allowed in Hoopilaina v. IHC 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1987). Where reasonable 
minds could differ on whether Defendant's conduct met the required standard, a genuine 
issue of fact exists. Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). Expert testimony 
is not necessarily always required in legal malpractice cases. Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 
P.2d 821, 826 n. 8 (Utah App. 1989). The elements of legal malpractice need only be 
supported by some competent evidence to avoid Summary Judgment. Harline v. Barker, 854 
P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993). 
3 
3. May a former client, Roller, testify Plaintiff breached its duty of care 
respecting billings, conflicts, disclosures, discovery, factual arguments, or other matters 
within the client's experience? 
Standard of Review: Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980), 
applied this principle in the medical malpractice context and held that expert testimony is 
unnecessary to establish the duty of care where the propriety of treatment is within the 
common knowledge and experience of the layman. This is consistent in legal malpractice 
cases, Wvcalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 826 n 8 (Utah App. 1989), Jackson v. 
Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982), Harline v. Barker, 854 P. 2d 595 (Utah App. 1993), 
as well as Brown v. Small 825 P. 2d 1209 (Mont. 1992) and Wilkinson v. Rives. 116 Cal. 
App. 3d 641, 647 (Cal.Ct.App. 1981), and Rule 701, Utah R. Evidence (lay opinions). 
4. May Defendant's expert Jeffrey W. Appel testify about the duty of care 
Plaintiff owed (1) to distinguish between appropriated and deeded water rights; (2) to 
defend against a fee title taking in the Cornish condemnation action; (3) to prepare 
complete findings for the Court; and (4) to perform the additional items as referred to in 
Mr. Appel's Affidavit dated December 14, 1995, R 586-594? 
Standard of Review: Utah Rules of Evidence, 702 and 703, opinion testimony 
by experts. The same standard as applies for review of Summary Judgment applies to the 
alleged "late" availability of Mr. Appel's testimony. The sanctions imposed by Rule 37, U.R. 
Civ. Pro. do not suggest dismissal until there is disobedience to an Order to Compel. 
Opportunities to get an expert much closer to the trial date were allowed in Hoopilaina v. 
IHC, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1987). 
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5. Whether the evidence, plus all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from that 
evidence interpreted most favorably to Defendant who opposed Summary Judgment, is 
sufficient for Roller to prevail in his malpractice counterclaim? 
Standard of Review: The same standards stated for issues No. 1, 2, 3, and 4 
apply to this issue. In legal malpractice cases, it is summarized in Jackson v. Dabney, 645 
P. 2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). 
6. Should the Trial Court grant Partial Summary Judgment to Defendant Roller 
on the accounting issues? 
Standard cf Review: This is an issue of law to be decided after the facts 
established by affidavit are reviewed. This Court need not defer to the ruling of the lower 
Court, but should review it for correctness. Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 
217, 218 (Utah 1992). Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). In reviewing Summary Judgment, the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are to be reviewed in a light most favorable to the 
non-moving party. Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 954 (Utah 1992). 
7. Should the Court of Appeals grant Roller attorney fees for the Interlocutory 
Appeal? 
Standard of Review: Utah Code §78-27-56 allows attorney fees in civil actions to the 
prevailing party. If the Court determines Plaintiff asserted its claim or its Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment without good faith, or that the Trial Court's decision was clearly 
erroneous, Koller could be awarded attorney fees on appeal. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 
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(Ut.Ct.App. 1991). All these issues were preserved for appeal by the Trial Court's Rule 
54(b) Certification and the Supreme Court's acceptance of an Interlocutory Appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
These questions of law should be considered in the context of Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. Summary Judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
U.R.C.P. 56(c), the relevant part of which reads: 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim 
or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service 
of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. (Emphasis added.) 
Because all facts and all factual inferences are to be reviewed in a light most favorable to 
the non-moving party, Roller is entitled to testify from his own experience about Plaintiffs 
failure to meet obvious duties of care. Hoopilaina, Jackson, Wvcalis, Harline, Brown, 
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Wilkinson, supra. Koller may also use Jeffrey W. Appel as an expert, even though Mr. 
Appel was available later than October 29, 1995 and he had only reached preliminary 
opinions. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991), Hoopilaina. Jackson. 
Wycalis, Harline, Brown, Wilkinson and cases cited in the Standard for Review for Issues 
No. 2 and 3. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an interlocutory appeal from a Summary Judgment ruling against Defendant. 
At the hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment held August 29, 1995, 
R 807-829, the Trial Court Judge said he had not read the affidavits and supporting 
documentation, R 808, but nevertheless concluded Defendant would have to have an expert 
to establish the duty of care breached by Plaintiff, and allowed Defendant 60 days to obtain 
an expert and have that expert available to be deposed, R 826. When Plaintiffs counsel 
prepared the order, he admitted1, R 375, he was "including" (read "adding") to the Court's 
Order that Defendant's expert be "fully" prepared with "final" opinions. March 18, 1996, 
Judge Ben H. Hadfield of the First District Court finally denied Defendant's Motion for a 
New Trial, and granted Defendant's Alternative Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification, R 683. 
Mr. Hanni's letter of August 31,1995 prefaces the proposed pleading in these 
words, "Although the Court did not specifically say that Defendant's expert 
witness or witnesses should be fully prepared and ready to express final 
opinions. . ." (Emphasis added.) 
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Defendant's Petition for Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order was served2 March 
21, 1996. June 19, 1996, the Utah Supreme Court (Case 960162) held the Interlocutory 
Order was a final Order for purposes of appeal. 
Prior to the Court's March 18,1996 Order Granting Rule 54(b) Certification, Koller 
had objected to the language and form of the Partial Summary Judgment. Koller moved 
for a hearing, R 412, because Plaintiffs form extended the bench ruling and required 
Defendant to have an expert "fully prepared to express final opinions" with respect to the 
legal malpractice claims on or before October 28,1995, which was within 60 days of August 
29, 1995. Defendant recognized final opinions' full preparation would take longer than 
preliminary preparation. Koller also wanted the order to read that expert testimony "may", 
rather than "will" be required. 
Because he could not, after all, meet the Court's deadline, on October 24, 1995, 
Koller moved to extend the time to obtain an expert. Defendant reminded the Court that 
before August 29, 1995, it had not imposed a discovery cutoff date, that discovery was not 
completed, there had been no pre-trial conference and no pre-trial order was entered. After 
August 29, 1995, Koller pointed out that Defendant and Plaintiff had each provided 
additional memoranda and affidavits for Partial Summary Judgment on the accounting 
issues, plus numerous pleadings concerning the Court's August 29, 1995 ruling. All this, 
together with Roller's farming and spending several days meeting in Salt Lake City with 
The Petition for Permission to Appeal was filed with the Utah Supreme 
Court. It is Case No. 960162. The effect of the March 18, 1996 Order was to 
enter the Partial Summary Judgment dated September 25, 1995. 
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proposed experts, and making progress, combined to justify extra time to obtain an expert. 
Defendant's motion was denied November 22 1995, R 563-576. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Case Below. 
The Court entered Partial Summary Judgment September 25, 1995. Defendant had 
until October 28, 1995 to designate an expert witness who, beyond the Court's statement of 
August 29, 1995, would be "fully" prepared to express "final" opinions with respect to the 
legal malpractice claims. Besides meetings with possible experts, Defendant helped prepare 
many pleadings, and tried to keep up with his farm, R 505-507. In December, one expert, 
Jeffrey W. Appel, was able to prepare preliminary opinions. The Affidavit of Attorney 
Jeffrey W. Appel, R 577-585, R 586-594, was first filed December 14, 1995. The Court's 
Memorandum Decision of November 22,1995 had denied Defendant a time extension after 
October 28, 1995, but Defendant filed a Motion and also a Memorandum for new trial, R 
567-594, on December 14, 1995, within 10 days of when the Order was served.3 
The Court issued Memorandum Decisions February 5, 1996 and February 21, 1996. 
The first denied the Motion for a New Trial. The second found there were material 
disputes about accounting facts. Both parties' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment on 
the accounting issues were denied. The Court's Order of March 19, 1996 formally denied 
Roller's Motion for a New Trial, and granted Roller's Rule 54(b) Certification4. 
The Order, R 626-627, was served December 12, 1995, but not signed until 
January 9, 1996. 




Roller's Petition for Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order was served 
March 21, 1996. June 19, 1996, the Utah Supreme Court in Case No. 960162, entered its 
Order finding the Trial Court's decision to grant Partial Summary Judgment was certifiable 
under Rule 54(b), Utah R.Civ.Pro. In Case No. 960162, the Supreme Court stated Roller's 
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal should be treated as a Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Parties. 
Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant, and Appellee Preston and Chambers, P.C. is a 
lawfirm located in Logan, Cache County, Utah. Legal services provided from Plaintiff to 
the Defendant were mostly provided by George W. Preston, a member of that firm. 
Defendant, Counterclaimant, and Appellant Evan O. Koller is an individual living in 
Cornish, Cache County, Utah. Evan O. Koller operates a large grain farm where he lives. 
The original Complaint against Evan O. Koller and his wife Marlene B. Koller was filed 
May 14, 1992. Marlene Koller died August 27, 1992, before the Defendant was served 
October 21, 1992. 
2. Background. 
Plaintiff represented the Defendant for approximately 15 years in various legal 
matters, much of which was for litigation with Cornish Town concerning access to water. 
The Complaint alleges their agreement for legal services ended July 20, 1988, R 2. 
Defendant admits this, R 7. On October 3, 1989, Koller and Preston met to discuss 
Preston's bill. Koller and Preston did not agree on the balance due, but they settled on an 
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amount. Koller paid the amount agreed on. Transcript, Deposition of Evan O. Koller, May 
10, 1993 (hereafter TR') pp 7-8. They left two matters open. Koller subsequently paid 
Preston & Chambers for work on the matters left open. Soon after their October 1989 
meeting, Preston redid the billings in several accounts, and sent Koller billings which had 
been changed for additional amounts. Koller refused to pay the additional amounts reflected 
on the billings which had been changed. TR 11, 13, 35. Transcript page numbers are used 
because the transcript was not indexed. See P. 21, 
Correspondence5 from Koller to Preston confirms Koller was not pleased with some 
of Plaintiffs work. Koller promised a malpractice counterclaim, R 189, if Preston chose to 
sue for additional amounts. Notwithstanding Plaintiff was paid more than $90,000 for work 
over the previous years, Plaintiff sued Defendant for $5,732.43, plus interest, it claimed was 
due on the "water rights" account, R 3. Koller counterclaimed, R 10-12, as he had 
promised, R 189-193. 
3. Finding a I^gal Malpractice Expert. 
August 29, 1995 the District Court gave the Defendant 60 days to find an expert 
witness and make the expert available to be deposed, R 820. Plaintiff added to this ruling 
that the expert had to be: "fully" prepared to express "final" opinions with respect to the 
legal malpractice claims, R 440, 375. Koller did not meet that timetable, notwithstanding 
Three detailed letters written September 23, 1990, June 7, 1991, and August 
13, 1991 appear in the Record at pages 187 to 197. These were attached as 
Exhibit D to Roller's 18 August 1995 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing Claim for Attorney Fees 
and In Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
Counterclaim, R 162-199. 
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reasonable and diligent efforts, R 505-507. Jeffrey W. Appel's preliminary expert opinions 
were presented by Affidavit December 14, 1995, R 577-594. Koller alleged Koller could 
testify about the duty of care missed by the Plaintiff for some of the malpractice issues, 
because Plaintiff's failure to meet the duty of care was sufficiently obvious that expert 
testimony should not be required, R 573-575, 200-231, 232-297, 298-345, 481-496. The 
Affidavit of Jeffrey W. Appel, presenting preliminary opinions, also showed several ways 
Plaintiff had probably failed in its duty of care to Koller, R 586-594. 
The Court began its hearing August 29, 1995 with the Judge's apology he had only 
looked at the file "this morning" for the first time, and had not reviewed all the memoranda 
and affidavits in "possibly 200 pages there", R 808.6 Judge Ben H. Hadfield did not choose 
to become familiar with the facts. He promised he would not get familiar with them, R 827, 
Lines 1-6! Without reading Roller's Affidavits, sworn answers to Interrogatories and other 
documents, he concluded Roller's malpractice claims must be supported by an expert R 825-
827. At the same time, the Judge admitted some claims may not require expert testimony, 
but the Judge chose not to sort out which ones did, and did not, require an expert, R 827. 
Because Plaintiffs Counterclaim was filed thirty-four months earlier, the Judge concluded 
Defendant should have already produced an expert, even while recognizing there had not 
been a discovery cut-off, R 825, line 20, to R 826, line 4. The Judge found Roller's position 
6
 There were actually 372 pages in the file. Pages 71 through 372 dealt with the 
Partial Summary Judgment Motion. Most of the material the Judge would 
not have read was Roller's Affidavit, R 200-231, and Roller's Answers to 
Plaintiffs First Interrogatories, R 232-297, and Roller's Supplemental 
Answers, R 298-346. Plaintiff produced no affidavits, but confined its Motion 
and Memorandum, R 71-158, to selected parts of Defendant's Answers to 
Interrogatories to show Defendant had not identified an expert. 
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"not credible", R 826, line 13. He ruled without becoming familiar with Roller's Affidavit 
and responses, R 159-199, 200-231, 232-346, and the material facts presented in it, R 808, 
827. Koller was familiar with all the matters and the facts, having participated throughout 
Plaintiffs prior representation, R 187-197, 200-231. 
During most of the 34 months after the lawsuit was filed and before August 29,1995, 
neither Plaintiff, Defendant, nor the Court advanced the case by requesting or conducting 
a discovery conference (Rule 26 (f) Utah R. Civ. P.), a pre-trial conference, setting a cut-off 
date for discovery, or setting a trial. Meanwhile, settlement discussions, plus formal and 
informal7 discovery took place. The Court asked for a status hearing May 22, 1995, R 69. 
Shortly thereafter, July 5., 1995, Plaintiff served its Motion for Summary Judgment, R 71. 
Defendant had requested a jury December 10, 1992. Koller was actually on notice only 
since August 29, 1995, R 826, he would be required to obtain an expert. Koller claims the 
Court's ruling, the 60-day deadline set by the Court, and the Court's refusal to grant an 
extension of time are abuses of discretion. 
4. Koller moved for an extension of Time. 
Besides farm work that had to be done in its season, R 505-507, Koller prepared 
Affidavits for the Court which were filed August 21, 1995, R 200-231; October 11, 1995, R 
481-496; and October 25, 1995, R 505-507. These showed material facts were disputed in 
the malpractice counterclaim. These also supported Roller's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on the accounting issues. Koller helped counsel prepare numerous pleadings that 
had to be filed after August 29, 1995, R 200-547. He met several days with counsel from 
7 R 67, 185, 189 and paragraph 10, R 202 
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two different Salt Lake City law firms to teach them about the case and obtain opinions, R 
505-507. The Affidavit from Jeffrey W. Appel, first supplied December 14, 1995, after the 
60-days allowed August 29, 1995, was not even acknowledged by the Court, R 626. 
Roller moved ex parte October 24,1995 for an extension of time to get an expert, but 
gave Plaintiff notice, R 499-509. The Court did not consider the motion because it was ex 
parte, R 563, 509, 547-550. The Court would not set the Motion for a hearing, R 563. 
When the Court wrote its Memorandum Decision November 22, 1995, it held that the 
motion had already been denied.8 The Memorandum Decision formally denied Roller's 
Motion for Extension of Time. The Court did not say why it did this, except that its original 
deadline had not been met. The original deadline had not been supported by specific 
findings there were not material disputed issues of fact. Nor could it have been supported 
by specific findings, because the Judge had not read the affidavits, R 808, 809, 827. 
The Trial Court did not decide which malpractice issues would require expert 
testimony, and which might not, R 827, Lines 1 to 6. The Judge actually commented that 
some malpractice issues might not require an expert, R 827. 
5. Facts About Other Issues. 
Not decided by the Trial Court was the accounting question. The parties each filed 
motions for Summary Judgment on the accounting issue, R 71, 378. Defendant's case is 
Since the Court had not considered the motion on its merits, the only possible 
reason the motion "has already (been) denied" is because Defendant asked 
the Court to grant it ex parte because of the rapidly approaching deadline. 
The Court said November 22, 1995 a hearing "is now moot", R 563. 
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somewhat persuasive, R 162-179,455-480, esp. 464-465.9 The Court of Appeals could grant 
Koller Partial Summary Judgment on the accounting issues, for the principal amount of 
$11,669.78. It could also grant Koller attorney fees on appeal. But for Defendant's 
Counterclaim, which alleged accounting disparities in addition to legal malpractice, the Trial 
Court would have granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint because the 
Complaint was not served within the period of time allowed by the rules, R 564, Part II of 
November 2, 1995 Memorandum Decision. Defendant had correctly pointed out the Court 
lacked jurisdiction on Plaintiff's Complaint, but argued the Court did have jurisdiction on 
the Counterclaim, R 163-165, 464-465. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The main question to be answered by this Interlocutory Appeal is whether Roller's 
malpractice Counterclaim against Preston should be restored, and tried before the requested 
jury.10 The Counterclaim should be reinstated because (1) Defendant could testify himself 
about part of the duty of care, and (2) Defendant's expert was unable to fully prepare by 
October 28,1995, but Jeffrey W. Appel could testify Plaintiff failed to meet its duty of care. 
Defendant could testify about matters which he personally knows, including more 
9
 Plaintiff admitted to total payments from Koller starting November 1, 1979 
and thereafter of $79,933.31, R 167, 178-180. See Addendum. On the other 
hand, Plaintiff established he paid $97,335.52 or $17,402.21 more, during the 
same period, R 201. Since Plaintiff sued for $5,732.43, Koller should get 
Partial Summary Judgment for a principal amount overpayment of $11,669.78 
on the accounting issue. 
i° A jury was demanded December 10,1992 while the case was still handled by 
the Cache County Department of the First District Court, Case No. 92-690; 
and again September 29, 1995, when the case was in the District Court, R 18, 
438. 
IS 
obvious breaches of the duty. The deadline imposed by the Court to get an expert with 
"fully" prepared, with "final" opinions in 60 days was an abuse of discretion because there 
was no discovery cut-off, there had been no Pre-Trial Conference, the parties had not 
completed discovery, and a trial date was not set. Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion was 
made after the Court had sent, R 69, notice for a status conference, when all such things 
could have been considered. The motion was premature and should not have been granted. 
Removal of a cause of action under Rule 37, U.R.C.P., is only appropriate after a 
discovery order has not been complied with. No such order had been made or refused. The 
question for Summary Judgment should not have been whether Defendant then had proof 
Plaintiff failed to meet its duties of care, but whether there were material disputed facts. 
Defendant's Affidavits and deposition are sufficient to establish there were, or could have 
been, breaches of duty. 
Defendant's expert, Jeffrey W. Appel, can present his expert opinions about the duty 
of care the Plaintiff had to (1) distinguish between appropriated water rights in comparison 
with deeded water rights; (2) to defend the Cornish condemnation action; (3) to prepare the 
Court's Findings and Amended Findings; and (4) additional items consistent with Mr. 
Appel's Affidavit dated December 14, 1995, R 589-594. 
On the other hand, facts supporting Partial Summary Judgment for Defendant, that 
Koller clearly paid more than he was credited by Plaintiff, are clear. When the Court made 
its rulings, that there were material issues of fact, the Plaintiff had provided sworn answers 
acknowledging $17,402.21 less had been paid than was actually paid. The Trial Court's 
findings should be reviewed for correctness, and Partial Summary Judgment awarded to 
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Koller. Within the time of these rulings, Plaintiff did not refute Roller's evidence, R 201, 
that Defendant overpaid Plaintiff at least $11,669.78, the difference between $97,335.52 
Koller paid, R 201, and the $79,933.31 Plaintiff said was paid, R 32-34, after November 1, 
1979, less the amount ($5,732.43) Plaintiff sued for, R 4. 
If the Court determines Plaintiff asserted its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
without good faith, or that the Trial Court's decision was clearly erroneous, Koller should 
be awarded attorney fees on appeal. 
Many facts pertaining primarily to the first issue are set forth in the argument. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN SUMMARILY HOLDING 
KOLLER COULD NOT PREVAIL ON MALPRACTICE 
ISSUES? 
The Trial Court granted Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Motion because 
Defendant had not designated an expert witness. Defendant had Counterclaimed for legal 
malpractice against Plaintiff after Plaintiff sued Defendant for $5,732.43, plus interest. 
Defendant had also counterclaimed for accounting errors by the Plaintiff. This part of the 
case remains to be tried, but could be simplified if the Court of appeals decides to review 
the Trial Court's decision and grant Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c), 
Rollins v.Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156,1158 (Utah 1991); Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 
1127,1129 (Utah 1990); and many other citations. The full Utah Supreme Court agreed in 
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 218 (Utah 1992): 
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Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, rather than fact, we 
are free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. . . We grant no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, but review them for 
correctness. . . (Citations omitted.) 
Sandy City, at 218. 
As the non-moving party, Koller is entitled to have his view of the facts presumed 
correct for purposes of the appeal. In Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 
954 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. . . (Citations omitted) We state the facts of the instant 
case-which we draw primarily from Retherford's affidavit submitted in 
opposition to AT&T's motion to dismiss-accordingly. See Sandy City v. Salt 
Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 215 (Utah 1992). 
Retherford, at 954. 
To successfully attack the Trial Court's ruling on Summary Judgment, it is not 
necessary to first marshall evidence supporting its decision and to then demonstrate that, 
even if viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence is legally insufficient to 
support the decision. Cases supporting this requirement, such as Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 
1176, 1178 (Utah 1989), require a marshalling all facts which support a ruling, but only 
where the evidence was presented in trial. This is not the standard for review of a Summary 
Judgment decision. Here, facts and inferences are to be viewed most favorably to Koller. 
All the facts and inferences known to the Trial Court, or rather the facts the Trial Court 
could have learned if it had read Defendant's Affidavit, show there are issues of material 
fact about Plaintiffs malpractice. 
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A. FACTS PERTAINING TO THIS ISSUE. 
Facts that demonstrate the merits of Roller's malpractice claim are contained in the 
Affidavit of Evan Koller, dated August 18, 1995, R 200-231, and argued in Defendant's 
"Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing 
Claim for Attorneys Fees and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Counterclaim", R 162-199, which includes exhibits A through E. (These 
exhibits are in Addendum.) These are among the materials to which the Court had 
reference when the Judge said he did not read the pleadings, R 827.11 The Honorable Ben 
H. Hadfield said August 29, 1995: 
I'm not going to go through the file at this point and read his 32 page 
affidavit, plus all the interrogatory answers and other things, and start 
identifying this issue doesn't need expertise, this one does, this one doesn't. 
I'm not going to get into that kind of exercise at this point. R 827. 
Additional facts submitted by Evan Koller include his Affidavit dated October 11, 
1995, R 481-496. This Affidavit, which is also Exhibit 14 to the Docketing Statement filed 
with Supreme Court Case No. 960162, was filed because the accounting issue was also raised 
by Plaintiff, R 378, on September 11, 1995 as an additional matter for Partial Summary 
These and Roller's Interrogatory Answers had been filed before the hearing. 
These were documents the Judge had not read at the beginning of the 
hearing, so he said, "If s not likely that I'll be able to give you a decision this 
morning on the issue", R 809, Line 5. The Judge earlier said, "I looked at 
this file this morning for the first time. I didn't know I had it on my calendar. 
I think there's possibly 200 pages there. I've done some speed reading this 
morning between hearings, but I don't think I have reviewed more than half 
of what is there. I have reviewed all of the memoranda, but the exhibits, and 
the affidavits, and the supporting documentation, I have only partially worked 
through", R 808, Line 19. 
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Judgment. August 18, 1995, Koller first moved for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
accounting question, R 161. Only the malpractice question was argued August 29, 1995. 
Plaintiffs September 11,1995 motion, plus Memorandum in Support thereof, R 379-
392, and attached Affidavit, R 393-411, all had to be answered while Defendant was also 
trying to obtain an expert. Roller's response filed October 11, 1995, includes the 
Memorandum beginning on page 456 of the Record. The Memorandum responds to 
Plaintiffs Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment and provides Roller's Reply in support 
of his own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Not insubstantial, it continues through 
page 480 of the Record, and is followed by Evan Roller's Affidavit of October 11, 1995, R 
481-496.12 
All these Affidavits, Answers to Interrogatories, and Roller's deposition were 
available to the Court when it made its rulings. On the other hand, Plaintiff presented no 
affidavits. Plaintiff merely argued Roller had not yet offered an expert to testify about 
whether these disputed facts breached Plaintiffs duty to Roller. 
Meanwhile, Plaintiffs counsel gratuitously (and successfully!) tried to improve the 
Court's decision of August 29, 1995, that Defendant obtain an expert within 60 days and 
make that expert available to be deposed. Mr. Hanni wrote the Court August 31, 1995, R 
375, admitting the Judge's decision had not required the expert to be "fully" prepared and 
ready to express "final" opinions on the malpractice claims. He said he added this language 
anyway. Defendant filed an Objection, R 412, 413, and requested a hearing on that 
An extension of time to reply to Plaintiffs Motion on the accounting was 
granted to Defendant, R 445 and 448. 
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question, R 412-413. This was briefed by the Plaintiff, R 424-435, and the Defendant, R 
442-444. The Partial Summary Judgment was entered September 25, 1995, R 452, without 
a hearing on Defendant's Objections as to Form. 
Before the August 29, 1995 hearing, the sworn evidence was completed August 22, 
1996 by filing Evan O. Keller's Answers, and Supplemental Answers, to Interrogatories with 
Exhibits. Defendant's Motion to publish these is at R 346. The Order was granted 
September 14, 1995, R 422, but they were already available to the Judge. Evan Roller's 
Answers to Plaintiffs First Interrogatories and Second Request for Production of 
Documents are in the Record at pages 232-297. Evan Roller's Supplemental Answers to 
Plaintiffs First Interrogatories and Second Request for Production of Documents are at 
pages 298-345. The Record was further supplemented with Evan O. Roller's original 
deposition, the Motion for which was filed September 11, 1995 by the Plaintiff, R 377; and 
stipulated to October 11, 1995 by Defendant, R 454. 
Mr. Roller's deposition taken May 10, 1993, is to be included in the Record on 
Appeal at pages , but was not indexed by the Clerk. It contains 83 pages, plus 
49 pages of Exhibits 1 through 9. It should probably be Record pages 830 through 961. 
With all these matters being addressed at and after the August 29, 1995 hearing, 
which fill half of Volume 1 and all the materials in Volume II, R 232-498, of the Court 
Record, Defendant moved October 25, 1995 for an extension of time to provide expert 
witnesses, R 499. Roller's Memorandum, R 01, refers to the numerous pleadings and 
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matters going on in the file after August 29,1995 R 499-508.13 It outlines the matters which 
had transpired since the hearing, R 501-504, and was supported by Evan Roller's Affidavit 
of October 24, 1995, R 505-507. The extension was opposed, R 534, 546. The Judge did 
not allow the requested hearing, R 547, but issued a Memorandum Decision November 22, 
1995, R 563-565. 
Defendant immediately filed a Motion for a New Trial, Motion to Reconsider, and 
Alternative Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification, R 567-568. This was supported by a 
Memorandum in Support of the Motion, R 569-576. As soon as it was available, the 
Affidavit of Jeffrey W. Appel was sent by facsimile to the Court, R 577-585, and the original 
was filed December 21, 1995, R 586-594. 
Plaintiff immediately continued to press for Summary Judgment on his accounting 
question, and on December 29, 1995, submitted a Supplemental Affidavit, R 604, 605-615. 
Before the Judge's next Memorandum Decision, Plaintiff also moved for attorney 
fees, R 616-625. Roller's memorandum opposed this, R 638-639. On January 12, 1996, 
Roller filed his Reply Memorandum in Support of a Motion for a New Trial, Motion to 
Reconsider, and Alternative Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification, and Evan Roller's 
Supplemental Affidavit of January 11, 1996, R 640-675. These were not short factual 
statements. They show Roller knew a great deal about the factual issues. The detailed facts 
The letter to the Court and Plaintiffs counsel dated October 24,1995, R 508, 
reminded the Judge that Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
together with the Plaintiffs Motion on the accounting, were still before the 
Court and that memoranda had been filed on all these after the hearing 
August 29. Several reasons were stated about why extending the time would 
be in the interest of justice. 
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there and in prior affidavits cannot be fairly summarized. Roller's initial Affidavit opposing 
summary judgment and the exhibits that were attached with it and the Memorandum, are 
in the Addendum. 
The Memorandum Decision was dated February 22, 1996, R 676-681. Pages 71 
through 683, about 612 pages of the Record, all deal with Summary Judgment. Summary 
Judgment is supposed to make the judicial function more efficient! When one considers the 
hours on both sides and the Court's time, had the Court read the affidavits and agreed there 
are materials issues of fact in dispute, and conducted a status conference to schedule 
discovery cut-off dates on August 29, 1995, it could have saved lots of time and expense for 
all. For example, the affidavits may now be studied by everyone arguing or deciding the 
appeal, instead of just one wise Trial Judge. There is no reason the Trial Court could not 
have conducted a discoveiy conference, set discovery cut-off dates, and even set a trial date 
on August 29, 1995. It should have refused or delayed Summary Judgment. 
B. ARGUMENT ON THIS ISSUE. 
Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P. allows the adverse party to serve opposing affidavits prior to the 
day of hearing. It has been shown that opposing affidavits had been so furnished. This rule 
only allows Summary Judgment to be granted: 
. . .If the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. . . 
Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P. 
Because Summary Judgment is granted as a matter of law rather than fact, the Court 
of Appeals is free to reappraise the Trial Court's legal conclusions. This may be done 
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without deference to the Trial Court's Conclusions of Law. Rather, the Trial Court's 
Conclusions should be reviewed for correctness. Sandy City v. Salt Lake County. 827 P.2d 
212, 218 (Utah 1992). 
In reviewing a grant of Summary Judgment, the Appeals Court should view the facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. Retherford v. AT&T Communications. 844 P.2d 949, 954 (Utah 1992). In 
Retherford, the facts were stated primarily from the non-moving party's affidavit submitted 
in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. The Order of Summary Judgment was 
reversed and the case remanded. Another example of this standard of review and this result 
is Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). 
II. WAS IT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO GRANT PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING A MALPRACTICE 
COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE 
AN EXPERT BEFORE DISCOVERY WAS COMPLETED? 
The elements of legal malpractice need only be supported by some competent 
evidence to avoid Summary Judgment. Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 
1993). Rule 37, Utah R.Civ.P. contemplates dismissal of a claim only after a discovery order 
is refused. Much later chances to get the expert were allowed in Hoopilaina v. IHC 740 
P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1987). Where reasonable minds could differ on whether 
Defendant's conduct met the required standard, a genuine issue of fact exists. Jackson v. 
Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). Expert testimony is not necessarily always required 
in legal malpractice cases. Wvcalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 826 n. 8 (Utah App. 
1989). 
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The elements of legal malpractice include: (1) an attorney-client relationship; (2) a 
duty of the attorney to the client; (3) a breach of that duty; (4) damages suffered by the 
client proximately caused by the attorney's breach of duty. These elements are set forth in 
Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993). The Harline decision held that the 
elements of legal malpractice need only be supported by "some competent evidence to 
support each element" to avoid Summary Judgment. IdL, at 598. 
The question August 29, 1995 was whether Koller had competent evidence to show 
Plaintiff breached its duty to Defendant. Without reading Roller's Affidavit, Answers to 
Interrogatories, and the exhibits thereto, the Trial Court guessed an expert would eventually 
be required. The Trial Court recognized that some issues may not need expertise to 
establish the duty of care. The Judge said he did not want to read Roller's 32-page Affidavit 
and identify "this issue doesn't need expertise", "this one does", "this one doesn't", R 827, 
lines 1 through 5. If the Judge had chosen to "get into that kind of exercise", he could have 
made Findings absolute in nature that expertise was required. He did not. The inferences 
available from the existence of Roller's unread Affidavit are sufficient to justify a conclusion 
that Roller could testify himself. 
The thrust of Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion was not whether Plaintiff 
breached its duty, but whether Defendant had an expert who would so testify. Plaintiff 
argued Defendant could not himself testify because the issues were too complex. The 
reasonable conclusions and inferences from Roller's Affidavit are that the case was not too 
complex for Roller to show there were issues of material fact in dispute. 
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In Harline, Mr. Harline opposed Mr. Barker's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Barker claimed he breached no duty. Summary Judgment was reversed. Footnote 2 in this 
decision refers to an attempt by the Defendant to claim the Summary Judgment was 
appropriate because an expert had not been produced. The Court of Appeals refused to 
consider that issue for the first time on appeal. Now that the Court of Appeals may 
consider this issue, it should still reject the argument that a case should be dismissed just 
because the claimant has not yet produced an expert. The Defendant in Harline also had 
a defense of ignorance that Plaintiff had falsified bankruptcy schedules. It is distinguishable 
from the instant case because there are no allegations Koller hid information or misled the 
Plaintiff in any of its legal representation. The instant case presents an even stronger case 
for reversal. 
All that should have been required by the Trial Court to reject Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment is to have found from the basis of facts in the record that 
reasonable minds could differ on whether the attorney's conduct met the required standard. 
That fact was not required to be shown by an expert witness in Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 
613, 615 (Utah 1982). Justice Oaks in that decision stated: 
Ordinarily, whether a defendant has breached the required standard of care 
is a question of fact for the jury. (Citations omitted.) Consequently, a motion 
for summary judgment should be denied where the evidence presents a 
genuine issue of material fact, which, if resolved in favor of the non-moving 
party would entitle him to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) 
(Other citations omitted.) A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis 
of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ on whether 
defendants' conduct measures up to the required standard. 
Jackson at 615. 
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A. WAS AN EXPERT REQUIRED TO DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT? 
No. Whether an expert witness is required in legal malpractice cases is case sensitive 
and definitely not an established doctrine. Harline cites an earlier decision, Wvcalis v. 
Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 826 n. 8 (Utah App. 1989), to discuss the standard of care, 
acknowledging expert testimony is ordinarily presented to establish standard of care in cases 
dealing with duties owed by a particular profession. Harline at 598, note 2. Wvcalis dealt 
with an alleged breach of duty by a trustee, Guardian Title. After pointing out why the 
applicable standard had not been established as a matter of law, the Court went on to state: 
Accordingly, the standard must be established factually in the course of 
ultimate resolution of this case, with an emphasis on standard-of-care-in-the-
industry evidence.8 (Note 8 is part of the Wvcalis decision.) 
Footnote 8 referred to, is helpful in the present case and reads as follows: 
Expert testimony may be particularly helpful in elucidating the standard of 
care applicable here. Where the average person has little understanding of 
the duties owed by particular trades or professions, expert testimony must 
ordinarily be presented to establish the standard of care. For instance, expert 
testimony has been required to establish the standard of care for medical 
doctors (citations omitted); architects (citations omitted); engineers (citations 
omitted); insurance brokers (citations omitted); and professional estate 
executors (citations omitted). 
Wvcalis at 826. 
Two things are instructive here from Wvcalis. First, the Court did not see fit to 
include lawyers in the listed professions in the footnote. Although it could have added them 
to the list, the fact that it did not suggests that expert testimony is not always required. 
Second, the reference that an "average person has little understanding of the duties owed 
by particular trades or professions" infers that so-called average people have at least some 
understanding. Koller himself could be considered more knowledgeable than many non-
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lawyers about the duty he expected because of familiarity with his cases. He certainly could 
testify about the facts and what he asked from the representation by the Plaintiff. 
This Court has reversed Summary Judgment initially granted for lack of an expert to 
establish the duty of care for a landlord. In Schrieder v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570 
(Utah App. 1994), the Court again discussed the question of whether expert testimony is 
either "helpful" or "necessary". In reversing, this Court referred to Wycalis, Supra., quoting 
Footnote 8 therefrom, which is also quoted above from Page 826. The Schrieder decision 
concluded that the Defendant Wasatch Manor had not shown an expert's testimony would 
be absolutely required. It then went on to state: 
Where the propriety of the Defendant's action "is within the common 
knowledge and experience of the lay man. . .the guidance provided by expert 
testimony is unnecessary." Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2 348, 352 (Utah 1980). 
Schrieder at 574. 
In commenting on whether expert testimony would be helpful in Schrieder, the Court 
concluded that a jury could reasonably find that Wasatch Manor was negligent, absent 
expert testimony. The Court said, "This is simply not a situation where the issues or facts 
appear to be so complex or technical that they would otherwise delude the mental processes 
of the average citizen." In the present case, Plaintiff argued that the issues were too 
complex for the average citizen, but did not prove it. The Trial Court should have 
construed the facts favorably to Koller. How could it? The Trial Court did not take time 
to review Roller's Affidavits or exhibits. It therefore had a very incomplete basis to evaluate 
the actual complexity of the issues or the actual need for expert testimony. 
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B. DID THE TRIAL COURT ACT TOO QUICKLY? 
Yes. The Trial Court acted prematurely by imposing the sanction of dismissing 
Roller's Counterclaim because Roller did not yet have an expert. Rule 37, Utah R. Civ. P. 
is directly applicable to this case because it refers to consequences for failures to make or 
cooperate in discovery and sanctions therefore. The important points of Rule 37 are: 
(A) Motion for Order Compelling Discovery. A party, upon reasonable 
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an 
order compelling discovery as follows: 
(2) Motion. If . . . a party fails to answer an interrogatory. . . the 
discovering party may move for an order compelling an answer. . . 
(B) Failure to Comply with Order. 
(2) Sanctions by Court in Which Action is Pending. If a party . . . 
fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an 
order made under subdivision (A) of this rule. . . or if a party fails to 
obey an order entered under Rule 26(f) (relating to discovery 
conferences), the court in which the action is pending may make such 
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the 
following: 
(A) An order that the matters. . .(are) established. . . 
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support 
or oppose designated claims or defenses or prohibiting him 
from introducing designated matters in evidence; 
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying 
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the 
action or proceeding or any party thereof, or rendering a 
judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
Rule 37 only contemplates the dismissal of a claim after a discovery order has been 
refused. No such discovery order was ever entered in this case. In fact, the discovery 
conference contemplated (Rule 26(f), Utah R. Civ. P.) was not even attempted by the Court 
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or the Plaintiff. It should have been. Rule 37 should have been complied with. It was 
disregarded. 
The severe action taken by the Trial Court is not only against the procedure 
contemplated by the Rules of Civil Procedure, it is also contrary to appropriate discretion. 
In Hoopilaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1987), the Plaintiff 
needed to prove that quinidine intended for another patient, but given to Hoopilaina by 
mistake caused injury to the Plaintiff. Judge Greenwood's summary explains why the Trial 
Court should have allowed Koller much longer to obtain an expert: 
Plaintiff claimed that the drug caused injuries to his lungs and cardiovascular 
system. On February 9,1984, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment 
based on plaintiffs failure to establish, through expert testimony, that the 
quinidine caused his injuries. Plaintiff admitted he did not have an expert, 
but asserted that he was attempting to obtain one and would have one before 
trial. Based on the representation, the court denied the motion without 
prejudice. The defendant filed a certificate of readiness for trial on May 5, 
1984, and the trial was set for September 17, 1984. Plaintiff did not object to 
the certification or the trial date. Defendant renewed his motion for summary 
judgment in July, 1984, and plaintiff again said he was trying to find an expert. 
The trial judge denied the motion and admonished plaintiff that he must have 
an expert. One week prior to trial at the pre-trial conference, Plaintiff was 
again asked about the expert. Plaintiffs counsel informed the judge that he 
would subpoena a doctor and hope that the doctor would testify as to 
causation. The trial judge found this to be insufficient and granted 
defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Emphasis added.) 
Hoopilaina, at 271. 
This Trial Court should, and could, have allowed Koller far greater latitude in 
obtaining an expert without even approaching the deadlines allowed in Hoopilaina. 
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in. MAY A FORMER CLIENT, ROLLER, TESTIFY PLAINTIFF 
BREACHED ITS DUTY OF CARE RESPECTING BILLINGS, 
CONFLICTS, DISCLOSURES, DISCOVERY, FACTUAL 
ARGUMENTS, OR OTHER MATTERS WITHIN THE 
CLIENTS EXPERIENCE? 
Yes. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980), applied this principle in the 
medical malpractice context and held that expert testimony is unnecessary to establish the 
duty of care where the propriety of treatment is within the common knowledge and 
experience of the layman. This concept is consistent with legal malpractice cases, including 
Wvcalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 826 n 8 (Utah App. 1989), Jackson v. Dabnev. 645 
P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982), Harline v. Barker, 854 P. 2d 595 (Utah App. 1993), Brown v. 
Small 825 P. 2d 1209 (Mont. 1992) and Wilkinson v. Rives. 116 Cal. App. 3d 641, 647 
(Cal.Ct.App. 1981), and Rule 701, Utah R. Evidence (lay opinions). 
Nixdorf was referred to in the prior section. The actual language of Nixdorf, which 
involved the reversal of a directed verdict in favor of Defendant physician, was as follows: 
However, this court has recognized certain exceptions to the general rule 
requiring expert testimony. (Citations omitted.) Specifically, expert testimony 
is unnecessary to establish the standard of care owed the Plaintiff where the 
propriety of the treatment received is within the common knowledge and 
experience of the layman. The loss of a surgical instrument or other 
paraphernalia, in the operating site, exemplifies this type of treatment. We 
explained in Fredrickson v. Maw: . . .If, however, a surgeon should lose the 
instrument in the incision.. . it would seem as a matter of common sense that 
scientific opdnion could throw little light on the subject. 
Nixdorf at 352. 
Whether Plaintiffs failures dropped to the level of leaving an instrument in an 
operating site is a question of fact. The presumptions and inferences to which Koller is 
entitled allow this Court to conclude, as the Trial Court should have concluded, that 
Plaintiffs alleged failure to meet the duty of care could have dropped to that level, thus 
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enabling Koller himself to establish the duty of care in some areas of the malpractice 
claim.14 
Utah R. Evidence 701, Opinion testimony by lay persons, allows lay witnesses to 
testify to a significant extent! It states as follows: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form 
of opinions or inferences are limited to those opinions or inferences which are 
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The duty of care required is a fact issue. Rule 702, Opinion testimony by experts, expands 
to explain how a lay or expert is qualified on expert topics. It states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
To a limited extent, Koller may well qualify to provide opinions of the duty of care required 
by the Plaintiff based on the Plaintiffs course of performance in representing him in 
numerous matters over a period of 15 years, their communications, their billings, their 
disclosures, instructions from Koller, and similar matters. 
Other jurisdictions have approved the concept that in legal malpractice actions, a 
former client's testimony may be sufficient to establish a breach of the required duty of care. 
One such example is Brown v. Small 825 P.2d 1209 (Mont. 1992), which stated: 
Even if Koller could not so testify, he should have been allowed more time 
to get an expert. See Arguments for Issues 2 and 4. 
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.. .There are instances in which legal malpractice actions have been submitted 
for fact determination without the use of expert testimony. The theory in 
such cases is that the attorney's misconduct is so obvious that no reasonable 
jury could not comprehend the lawyer's breach of duty. [Citing Carlson v. 
Morton, 745 P.2d 1133, (Mont. 1987)]. 
Was Plaintiffs breach of duty so obvious that a reasonable jury could comprehend it? 
Inferences to which Roller was entitled at the August 29, 1995 hearing suggest a jury could 
comprehend those breaches. The Trial Court did not analyze Roller's documents and 
affidavits sufficient to actually make a finding. The Trial Court had available many of the 
cases discussed in this Brief when it considered the memoranda relating to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment August 29, 1995. Included in the briefs were Wvcalis, Harline, and 
Brown. The Trial Court failed to appreciate these decisions argued against granting 
Summary Judgment, at least at that stage of the proceedings. 
The California decision of Wilkinson v. Rives, 116 Cal.App.3d 641 (Cal.Ct.App. 1981) 
stated: 
Where the failure of attorney performance is so clear that a trier of fact may 
find professional negligence unassisted by expert testimony, then expert 
testimony is not required. (Citing Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal.App.3d 802.) 
Wilkinson at 647. 
The case referred to in Wilkinson, Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal.App.3d 802 (Cal.Ct.App. 
1975) contains this statement: 
In some circumstances, the failure of attorney performance may be so clear 
that a trier of fact may find professional negligence unaided by the testimony 
of experts. Where, however, the malpractice action is brought against an 
attorney holding himself out as a legal specialist and the claim against him is 
related to his expertise as such, then only a person knowledgeable in the 
speciality can define the applicable duty of care and opine whether it was met. 
(Citation omitted.) 
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In the instant case, while Plaintiff has argued representation by Preston & Chambers was 
complicated, it has not argued the Plaintiff lawfirm held itself out as legal specialists 
requiring knowledge of a specialist to establish their duty of care. 
Even the Trial Court acknowledged that the duty of care in some of Roller's claim 
could be established by Roller's testimony alone, R 827. In a legal malpractice case, the 
former client should always be able to state his opinion as to whether he thinks the Plaintiff 
breached the duty. While such testimony may not be given as much weight as testimony 
from an expert, it should be given some weight. This is consistent with the well-established 
principle that a property owner may give his opinion about his own property. Anderson v. 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 583 P.2d 101, 104 (Utah 1978), recites this as follows: 
This Court has long adhered to the rule that an owner of property is entitled 
to give his opinion thereon. (Citations omitted.) . . .His testimony is to be 
given such weight and credibility as the trier of fact finds reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
Anderson at 104. 
This issue can also be considered in light of the other cases in prior arguments. 
Koller may testify as to matters within his experience and provide his opinions about many 
issues regarding Plaintiffs representation of his cases. He will be able to testify the Plaintiff 
did not meet obvious duties. 
34 
IV- MAY DEFENDANTS EXPERT JEFFREY W. APPEL TESTIFY 
ABOUT THE DUTY OF CARE PLAINTIFF OWED (1) TO 
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN APPROPRIATED AND DEEDED 
WATER RIGHTS; (2) TO DEFEND AGAINST A FEE TITLE 
TAKING IN THE CORNISH CONDEMNATION ACTION; (3) 
TO PREP^LRE COMPLETE FINDINGS FOR THE COURT; 
AND (4) TO PERFORM THE ADDITIONAL ITEMS AS 
REFERRED TO IN MR. APPEL'S AFFIDAVIT DATED 
DECEMBER 14, 1995, R 587-594? 
The same argument that applies for the first two issues applies to answer that the 
alleged "late" availability of Mr. Appel's testimony, should be allowed. The sanctions 
imposed by Rule 37, Utah R. Civ. P. do not suggest dismissal until there is disobedience to 
an Order to Compel. Opportunities to get an expert much closer to the trial date were 
allowed in Hoopilaina v. IHC 740 P.2d 270,271 (Utah App. 1987) and Utah R. of Evidence 
703, regarding opinion testimony by experts, suggests this issue is easily answered "yes" for 
appeal purposes. Mr. Jeffrey W. Appel's testimony should be admissible under Rule 703 
Utah R. Evidence, Bases of opinion testimony by experts: 
The facts or date in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion 
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or 
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts 
or date need not be admissible in evidence. 
We have discussed that Defendant himself has perceptions about his particular cases, 
and should be able to express his opinions. Based on his affidavit, R 587-594, Addendum 
Exhibit 4, Mr. Appel will be able to express opinions. He may rely on the record of this 
case, the records of the parties to the underlying cases, and be able to express the duty of 
care required, without necessarily admitting into evidence facts or data upon which he bases 
some of those opinions. Rule 703, second sentence. 
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Mr. Appel should be able to testify whether the Plaintiff achieved the duty of care 
stated in Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887 (Utah 1988) that: 
Once an attorney-client relationship has been established, the attorney 
"impliedly agrees to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of 
ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance 
of the tasks which they undertake. (Citations omitted.) 
Williams at 889. 
V. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE, PLUS ALL REASONABLE 
INFERENCES FAIRLY DRAWN FROM THAT EVIDENCE 
INTERPRETED MOST FAVORABLY TO DEFENDANT WHO 
OPPOSED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IS SUFFICIENT FOR 
ROLLER TO PREVAIL IN HIS MALPRACTICE 
COUNTERCLAIM? 
The same standards argued for issues No. 1, 2, 3, and 4 apply to this issue. In legal 
malpractice cases, it is summarized in Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P. 2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). 
The allegations against Dabney by Mr. Jackson were that he did not do as much as he could 
have done to prevent a foreclosure sale. Dabney supposedly should have reduced the 
judgment to writing, confirmed the settlement with a letter, and/or taken the money to the 
creditor. This factual setting gave rise to a reversal of Summary Judgment. The words of 
Justice Oaks referred to above in this argument hold true in this case too. There indeed 
is a genuine issue of fact upon which reasonable minds could differ on whether the lawyer's 
conduct measured up to the required standard. 
Because reasonable minds could differ on whether Plaintiffs conduct measured up 
to the required standard, this case should be remanded because Koller may prevail on his 
malpractice Counterclaim. 
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VI. SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT GRANT PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT ROLLER ON THE 
ACCOUNTING ISSUES? 
This is an issue of law to be decided after the facts established by affidavit are 
reviewed. This Court need not defer to the ruling of the lower Court, but should review it 
for correctness. Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 217, 218 (Utah 1992). 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
56(c). In reviewing Summary Judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom are to be reviewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Retherford 
v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 954 (Utah 1992). 
Facts sufficient for this Court to review whether Koller should be awarded Partial 
Summary Judgment of the accounting issue are sufficiently referred to in the Statement of 
Facts to allow the Court of Appeals to affirmatively answer this question. 
VII. SHOULD THE COURT OF APPEALS GRANT KOLLER 
ATTORNEY FEES FOR THE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL? 
Utah Code §78-27-56 allows attorney fees in civil actions to the prevailing party. If 
the Court determines Plaintiff asserted its claim or its Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment without good faith, or that the Trial Court's decision was clearly erroneous, Koller 
could be awarded attorney fees on appeal. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Ut.Ct.App. 
1991). 
The Jeschke case is all about attorney fees in the trial court. In writing for the Court 
of Appeals, Judge Jackson writes that the Trial Judge erred in his award of Rule 11 
sanctions, but affirmed the award of attorney fees because Mr. Jeschke purposely 
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disregarded the truth and misrepresented material facts. The last paragraph of the opinion 
notes that Defendant requested sanctions and attorney fees on appeal. The Court of 
Appeals declined to award sanctions and fees on appeal. Koller is asking for is fees on 
appeal if this Court concludes the law and facts in this case did not support the motion 
made by the Plaintiff and the decision by the Trial Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court granted Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Motion because 
Defendant had not designated an expert witness. Defendant had Counterclaimed for legal 
malpractice against Plaintiff after Plaintiff sued Defendant for $5,732.43, plus interest. 
Defendant also counterclaimed over accounting overbillings by the Plaintiff. The accounting 
issues remain to be tried, but could be simplified if the Court of Appeals reviews the Trial 
Court's decision and grants Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The elements of legal malpractice are supported by competent evidence sufficient to 
avoid Summary Judgment. Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993). Rule 
37, Utah R.Civ.P. contemplates dismissal of a claim only after a discovery order is refused. 
No Order existed August 29, 1996. Much closer-to-trial chances to get an expert were 
allowed in Hoopilaina v. IHC 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1987). Where reasonable 
minds could differ on whether Defendant's conduct met the required standard, a genuine 
issue of fact exists. Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). The real issue is 
whether there were disputed facts, not whether Defendant could prove the duty of care. 
Expert testimony is not necessarily always required in legal malpractice cases. Wycalis v. 
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Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 826 n. 8 (Utah App. 1989) does not list the legal profession 
as these where an expert's opinion of breach of duty is always required. 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980) held that expert testimony is 
unnecessary to establish the duty of care in medical cases where the propriety of treatment 
is within the common knowledge and experience of the layman. Legal malpractice cases 
are in step with this pattern. Wvcalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 826 n 8 (Utah App. 
1989), Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982), Harline v. Barker, 854 P. 2d 595 
(Utah App. 1993), Brown v. Small, 825 P. 2d 1209 (Mont. 1992) and Wilkinson v. Rives, 116 
Cal. App. 3d 641, 647 (Cal.Ct.App. 1981), all allow for the possibility that lay testimony of 
the duty can be enough. 
The "late" availability of Jeffrey W. Appel's expert opinion is still before any 
discovery conference or discovery cut-off date. The sanctions imposed by Rule 37, U.R. Civ. 
Pro. do not suggest dismissal until there is disobedience to an Order to Compel. 
The legal malpractice standard summarized in Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P. 2d 613, 615 
(Utah 1982) caused reversal of Summary Judgment. Justice Oaks acknowledged these, and 
probably would acknowledge here, that there indeed was a genuine issue of fact upon which 
reasonable minds could differ on whether the lawyer's conduct measured up to the required 
standard. There was no mention of the need for an expert to so testify as of the Summary 
Judgment hearing. 
This Court need not defer to rulings of the lower Court, but should review them for 
correctness. Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 217,218 (Utah 1992). Summary 
Judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving 
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party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). In 
reviewing Summary Judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are 
to be reviewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Retherford v. AT&T 
Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 954 (Utah 1992). 
Utah Code §78-27-56 allows attorney fees in civil actions to the prevailing party. If 
the Court determines Plaintiff asserted its claim or its Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment without good faith, or that the Trial Court's decision was clearly erroneous, Koller 
should be awarded attorney fees on appeal. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Ut.Ct.App. 
1991). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of November, 1996. 
RAYMOND N. MALOUF 
Attorney for Appellant 
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informal discovery continuing R 185 
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See also exhibits in Docketing Statement with Supreme Court case 96-162. See also the full 
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Volume 1 1-231 
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Volume 3 534-806 
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EVAN O. KOLLER, ) Case No. 930000019 
Defendant and Counterclaimant. ) Honorable Ben H. Hadfield 
Comes now the Defendant, Evan 0. Roller, and states the 
following of his own personal knowledge: 
1. I am the Defendant and Counterclaimant in this action. 
To the extent work was done for Roller Corporation, I was 
President of that corporation. 
2. Plaintiff and his lawfirm represented Roller in a 
number of matters, beginning about November 1, 1979 and 
continuing (as Plaintiff alleged and I admitted) through July 20, 
1988. 
3. I am competent to testify about the facts in dispute 
between Roller and others, what Roller asked Plaintiff and George 
Preston to do, what I saw and heard Plaintiff do, the billings 
Roller has received, the money Roller has paid the Plaintiff, and 
mistakes Plaintiff and Roller made that I observed. 
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FIRST D I S T R I C T C w i j R T 
A r. H ' 
95 AUG 18 P 5 : i 5 
4. In Plaintiff's answer to Interrogatory No. 3 of 
Defendant's First Set Of Interrogatories, which asked how much 
Roller had paid Plaintiff from and after November 1, 1979, Mr. 
Preston specified payments between March 1981 and June 28, 1990, 
the total of which was $79,933.31. 
5. Roller records from the date of November 1, 1979 
onward, the date after which I asked for Plaintiff's accounting, 
show Roller has paid Plaintiff $97,335.52. The difference is 
still $17,402.21 in Roller's favor. 
6. The amount of provable Roller payments in excess of 
Plaintiff's admitted receipts exceeds the principal amount asked 
for by the Complaint, $5,732.43, by $11,669.78. Without further 
accounting analysis, Roller is due a refund. 
7. I do not have all of the billing records. Plaintiff 
furnished Roller copies of what attorney Tom Willmore said were 
all of the billings in 1992 when this lawsuit began. Plaintiff's 
attorney (Tom Willmore) argued these billings somehow were 
justification for Plaintiff's claim. The bills did not make 
sense to me, so I looked at them closely, more closely than when 
Plaintiff firm still represented me. 
8. From the billing copies that were furnished, I can 
demonstrate that some of Plaintiff's billings asked a second time 
for some moneys Roller had already paid. My sworn Answers to 
Interrogatories explain many of these details. The billings 
furnished were not a complete record of Roller payments. 
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9. On some last-minute billings, Plaintiff transferred 
payments Roller made for certain accounts and bills between 
accounts and bills without Roller permission and without an 
adequate explanation. These transfers were not agreed to and 
appear to me to be negligent or intentional efforts to get Roller 
to pay the Plaintiff more than it was entitled. 
10. December 7, 1994, through counsel, Roller asked to look 
through the files Plaintiff has remaining, and also asked for a 
comprehensive list of those files. (Please see a copy of the 
letter my counsel wrote to Plaintiff's counsel dated December 7, 
1994 in Exhibit C, attached to the Memorandum.) I believe such 
files will contain more information that will support Roller 
claims of billing malpractice, accounting errors, and legal 
malpractice. 
11. Roller trusted and relied on Plaintiff to make accurate 
billings and to apply appropriate credits, just as Roller 
initially relied on Plaintiff's legal advice. After I made a 
payment to Mr. Preston October 3, 1989, which I understood at the 
time to be a complete ,settlement of all current and past claims 
for fees, but which^subsequently rejected, I learned not to trust 
the billings and am very concerned about Plaintiff's acts as 
reflected by billing changes and discrepancies. 
12. One example of double-billing and over-billing by the 
Plaintiff is from the Buttars case, designated on the billings as 
"ROL204-05M. Before beginning this case, Mr. Preston told me he 
was not licensed to practice in Idaho, but could do so if an 
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Idaho attorney sat in on the case. I told him I did not want to 
pay for him and an Idaho attorney. Mr. Preston told me he would 
work that out with the other attorney and adjust their billings, 
so Roller would not have to pay for two attorneys. The Plaintiff 
sent me a letter dated July 29, 1982, in which he stated: 
Our computer is just getting our billings out and by 
error it billed you too much. Our bill is $3,037.44 
and Randall Budge's bill is $1,162, totalling 
$4,199.44. You are refunded $1,160.56. We have paid 
Randy Budge's bill to date. Thank you. 
Mr. Budge was the Idaho attorney. A hand-written note on the 
bottom of the page refers to the refund. Mr. Budge wrote Mr. 
Preston a letter dated August 3, 1982 which said he was returning 
the $1,162 to Mr. Preston and, because Roller had already paid 
him, directed that $1,162 be refunded to Roller. Mr. Budge 
billed Roller direct for service through June 30, 1982 and was 
paid July 28, 1982. Roller paid Mr. Preston $5,360. These two 
payments by Roller totalled $6,522. Mr. Preston sent $1,162 to 
Mr. Budge, which was returned to Mr. Preston. Mr. Preston as is 
apparent from his 29 July letter, returned $1,160.56 to Roller. 
Roller, therefore, paid a net amount of $4,199.44 to Mr. Preston. 
However, Mr. Preston's bill was only $3,037.44, according to this 
letter. Subtracting $3,037.44 from $4,199.44 leaves another 
$1,162 that Roller overpaid Plaintiff. This is over and above 
the $1,160.5 6 Plaintiff apparently returned to me; and over and 
above the $1,162 I paid Mr. Budge directly. 
13. I attached copies of documents relating to the Buttars 
facts to my answers to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories 
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and Second Request for Production of Documents, signed September 
29, 1993. Although Plaintiff attached copies of my answers to 
its motion, it did not attach any exhibits, including these 
referred to from the Buttars case billings. The court should 
take notice of all my sworn Answers and the exhibits. But, to 
continue. 
14. July 28, 1982 I wrote Check No. 2947 to the Plaintiff 
for $5,360 for attorney fees. I have a billing dated July 19, 
1982 for client code tfROL204-01" ("General work"). To me, the 
July 29, 1982 letter from Plaintiff affirms this billing was for 
work on the Buttars case. Plaintiff did not give Roller a credit 
for the $1,162 over-payment. 
15. Besides not giving Roller a credit for the $1,162 
overpayment, in answering Defendant's Interrogatory No. 3, Mr. 
Preston (see paragraph 4, herein and Exhibit B to Memorandum) 
does not admit getting this July 28 payment of $5,360. Nor does 
Plaintiff refer to the amounts $3,037.44 or $1,162. Roller is 
entitled, by just this one example, to an additional credit from 
Plaintiff of at least $5,360, less the $1,160.56 apparently sent 
back or $4,199.44. This is part of the $17,402.21 referred to 
above in paragraph 5. 
16. Work and the billings on another matter, the 3/4-inch 
Tap Appeal, billed as lfROL204-10!,, contains good examples of the 
Plaintiff's malpractice. This case started in Cache County as 
Civil No. 18267. Trial was February 17, 1983. In asking 
questions of Dee C. Hansen, Mr. Preston tried to limit the deeded 
5 
Roller water right to only enough gallons per mintue to supply 
one home. This would have done violence to the use of the water 
reserved to Roller by contract and the October 11, 1968 deed from 
Emma Marie Dobbs granting Roller: 
"Any and all water or water rights belonging 
to, or used on or in connection with, or in 
any way appertaining to all of the above 
tracts of land in this Warranty Deed however 
evidenced.,f 
He tried to reduce our right to an irrigation right, which 
Cornish could have subsequently condemned for a higher use. 
Towards the conclusion of Mr. Preston's questions trying to 
establish this with Dee Hansen, the following exchange is taken 
from the transcript of testimony of Dee C. Hansen, Civil No. 
18267, February 17, 1983 pl8-19, 22-23, 38: 
Q (by Mr. Preston) You've never found a deed where 
Emma Pearson (Emma Marie Pearson Dobbs, known as Marie, 
she was the daughter of Emma Pearson) conveyed to 
anyone but Evan Roller. 
A No. 
Q And you've never found a deed where Emma Pearson 
conveyed her interest to the city? 
A No. 
Q And in the deed from Emma Pearson to Evan Roller, 
water rights were in fact conveyed, were they not? 
A Yes. 
Q Have you visited this particular spring area? 
A No, I haven't. 
Q You've heard Mr. Mike Turnipseed testify that he has 
in fact visited the spring area? 
A Yes. 
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Q And on various occasions the entire flow of this 
water is directed down the Cornish pipe? 
Mr. Fillmore: Excuse me, George, you're saying 
the entire flow. 
Mr. Preston: Of the spring area is directed down 
the pipe. 
Mr. Fillmore: Is that in evidence? 
A I didn't hear Mike testify to that. If he did he 
did it in error, because it doesn't all flow down the 
pipe. 
Q Some of it flows down the hollow? 
A Right. 
Q And have you determined the amount that flows down 
the hollow? 
A I haven't. 
Q Any amount that would flow down the hollow and not 
into the pipe, that would, of course—Butler Hollow 
ultimately flows to the Roller property? 
A Yes . . . 
Q So what was retained then by Emma Pearson, and there 
was a house constructed down there at that time, what 
was retained by Emma Pearson would have been what? The 
one fifth interest in what type of rights? 
A Well, Emma Pearson was the mother. 
Q I don't mean Emma, I mean Emma Marie Dobbs, I'm 
sorry. I'm talking about—we will call her Marie 
Dobbs. 
A If you don't get confused, I will. 
Q Yeah. Her name is Emma Marie Pearson Dobbs. Okay, 
let's go on that. The type of water rights not 
conveyed by Marie Pearson Dobbs was what? 
A Would have been one-fifth interest in the Pearson 
spring. 
Q Now would that— 
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A Or the Butler Hollow rights in total. 
Q Would that be a summer right or a summer-winter 
right as you've indicated here? 
A I think it's both. 
Q Summer and winter diligence claim? 
A I think it's a fifth interest of the summer 
irrigation right and a fifth interest of whatever 
winter rights there was. One-fifth of one family right 
perhaps or ten cows or whatever they watered there. 
Q You found in your Memorandum Decision that there was 
no unappropriated water in that, coming out of Pearson 
spring. 
A We made that determination on Butler Hollow in 
total. Pearson Spring was part of the system. 
Q I'm not concerned—Cornish has no water rights out 
of Butler Hollow, the lower hollow springs, do they? 
A No, but, see, the rights that make it fully 
appropriated are partly made up from Butler Hollow. 
The filings owned by Emma. . . . 
Q One more question, I think. Do your books and 
records reflect an appropriable, a total flow out of 
Pearson's Springs in excess of 26 gallons per minute? 
A Yes. If you take into account Butler Hollow. 
Q No, I don't mean Butler Hollow. 
A Well, you have to, because it is part of the total 
appropriation system. 
Q But you've got me so—Judge, I hope you're 
straightened around. 
The Court: I've got it all figured out. 
Mr. Preston: Huh? 
The Court: I've got it all figured out. 
Mr. Preston: Well, I'll tell you, I guess that's why 
there are judges and lawyers. Judge's are smarter than 
lawyers by a whole bunch. 
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17. I can explain my understanding about Roller water 
rights in the deeds between Roller predecessors and others. I 
can also explain how I observed Mr. Preston fail to appreciate 
Roller water rights as early as this trial in 1983. 
18. Roller water rights derived from Marie Pearson Dobbs, 
who owned one-fifth of the Pearson spring and conveyed to Roller 
in 1968 because the Town of Cornish would not accept her terms in 
1939. The other four-fifths in the water were transferred to 
Cornish by a Quit Claim Deed March 2, 1938. The four-fifths 
transferred retained the grantor's right to use the water, which 
right was prior to the town's. So grantor's retained the first 
right to use all the water. The conveyance allowed Cornish to 
distribute the water. Rights-of-way were exchanged. The town 
was to provide water to one of the two homes on the property. 
The other home was owned by Marie Pearson Dobbs. The town was to 
provide water from the town system for human drinking, culinary, 
domestic, and stock watering uses. The grantors agreed to a 3/4" 
service connection at the point where the town delivered the 
water. The grantors required that all water be metered, 
evidently to safeguard the one-fifth interest not granted, and to 
divide the water among the four-fifths. These were the contract 
rights. 
19. Roller filed on the one-fifth interest which had been 
retained by Marie Pearson Dobbs. Her rights derived from use of 
the water since before statehood. The Town of Cornish filed on 
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the Pearson Spring. The dispute was who had first rights in the 
spring. 
20. The town's right to use the water in the Pearson Spring 
was subject to the reserved rights in the contract with the town, 
and to the reservation for first use of the water because 
Pearson's rights were ahead of the town's rights. 
21. The town accepted the contract at the time. The Utah 
Supreme Court ruled in the first Roller decision that the Town of 
Cornish was subject to the terms of the contract. 
22. Emma Marie Pearson Dobbs had obtained title to all 
Pearson rights (five-fifths) in the Pearson Spring through 
probate of the Pearson estate. Thus, Roller obtained all the 
rights retained by any of the grantors and had the right to first 
use of all the water if he needed it, before Cornish could use 
the remainder. 
23. Rights to the Griffiths Spring were also an issue. 
Cornish became the appropriator of the Griffiths Spring and 
obtained a condemnation right for the spring March 2, 1938. 
Griffiths rights were acquired by Roller who bought the property 
and water rights from Griffiths, allowing Roller to precede the 
town's right to Use this water. The Court Decree November 30, 
1988 said Cornish Town "shall deliver to the east fence line of 
the spring area herein-above described, a sufficient supply of 
water for the culinary and domestic purposes of (Rollers) and for 
watering of a small lawn, for the watering of cattle and horses 
used and grazed upon the premises. . .". 
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24. Utah has regulations that apply to water systems that 
supply water to 15 or more service connections or a certain 
number of people. Cornish Town has more than 60 connections and 
has to comply with these regulations. By chance, Roller happened 
to see a copy of the regulations in a health department office 
and furnished a copy to attorney George Preston to use in the 
water cases. 
25. Nevertheless, Plaintiff did not lay enough foundation 
for the court about State regulations regarding water pressures, 
pipe sizes, and quality which apply to any water supplier 
supplying water for domestic purposes to more than 15 service 
connections. 
26. Before the first 1983 trial, I learned that Cornish 
would have a water engineer named Vaughn Hansen testify at trial, 
and asked Mr. Preston if it would be a good idea to get an expert 
who could testify to the facts in Roller's interest. Mr. Preston 
advised it would be a waste of money, as he could use the town's 
expert to serve Roller's interest. The town's expert testified 
erroneously to many material facts, including the State 
regulations. This testimony coupled with Mr. Preston's lacks of 
understanding of Roller's deeded and contractual water rights 
unnecessarily prolonged the litigation. 
27. After the original 1983 case, Plaintiff failed to 
prepare proper and complete Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
Judgment and Decree for Judge Christopherson. The failure 
allowed Cornish to take severe advantage against Roller November 
11 
15, 1988 in a court hearing that compounded the lawsuit and cost 
the Rollers thousands of dollars in unnecessary costs, by 
requiring additional hearings and additional appeals over the 
issue of where the Koller connection should be and whether the 
state regulations applied to water delivered to Cornish. 
28. On February 23, 1983, Judge ChristqgJierson ruled from 
the bench that (a) the town had to deliver the water to a 3/4" 
tap or service connection located in a box about 50 feet behind 
the present Koller home; (b) the quality of the water had to meet 
human drinking water standards; and (c) the use of the water was 
not limited by gallons per minute, but by the uses for which the 
right was reserved in the grant. 
29. A dispute arose as to where the 3/4" tap connection 
should be, which was discussed in the brief Cornish submitted to 
the Supreme Court in 1985. The Town of Cornish stated: 
The Pearsons knew that the Town of Cornish was 
purchasing the spring for the development of a 
municipal culinary-quality water system, and it was 
that system of which they wanted to be a part. If 
Pearsons had wanted their own line connected directly 
to the Pearson Spring, they should have made express 
provisions for the same. The only fair and reasonable 
interpretation of the language of the deed, is that the 
town committed to supply Kollers with a 3/4-inch tap 
for culinary and domestic water, and the town must 
determine how to get that water to them. (Cornish 
brief, pp. 12 and 13.) 
30. The Pearson Spring was the only water available to the 
homes on the Pearson property at the time and for the next 35 
years. It was the only water they could reserve. They did not 
own any other water. Nevertheless, the Town of Cornish argued on 
page 14 "that the point of the Court's ruling is that it is 
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solely in the town's discretion where that hookup is made, so 
long as the water is of culinary and domestic quality". 
31. Mr, Preston failed to clearly place in the judgment, 
Order and Decree the trial Court's 1983 ruling regarding water 
quality and the location of the 3/4-inch tap. The result was the 
appeal, in which the Supreme Court reversed the District Court's 
1988 decision to change the source of supply. The Supreme Court 
did not address the issue of quality, as it was not then an issue 
in dispute. Because of the Plaintiff's failures, the lawsuit is 
still not wholly resolved and it turned into an expensive mess. 
Only because of negotiations with the Town of Cornish are Rollers 
slowly working toward some settlement. No thanks are due 
Plaintiff, because this lawfirm failed to include in final signed 
pleadings the three points orally stated October 23, 1983 (see 
paragraph 28). 
32. I can testify as to all these things, as I was present, 
heard them and have seen the results from the opinions, which are 
plain enough to read. 
33. In 1986, on March 17, Cornish sought to condemn Roller 
property in order to control the springs. This second Cornish 
lawsuit dealt with condemnation. This lawsuit should have been 
avoided by a proper conclusion of the first one, but was not, for 
the reasons stated above. When Roller resisted the town's 
purchase of the land, Cornish said it was imperative it have a 
full fee title to the land, which would have included oil, 
mineral, hunting, public assets rights, and everything else. 
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U.C.A. §78-34-2 lists purposes for which a fee simple 
condemnation taking is allowed. Protection zones and rights-of-
way for a spring are not among the purposes listed. For all 
other takings, only an easement is reguired. 
34. Utah public drinking water regulations do reguire 
protection zones above springs to protect them from concentrated 
sources of pollution, such as septic tanks, drain fields, garbage 
dumps, pit privies, drain lines, sewer lines, corrals, etc. 
Normal cropping or farming operations are not included in the 
list. Rollers have no concentrated sources of pollution above 
the springs; therefore, the uses for which the town sought to buy 
or condemn the land were not uses authorized by law. 
35. Plaintiff and Mr. Preston failed to research and press 
this point of law in defending the condemnation hearing, which 
went forth as Cache County case no. 25058. The transcript from 
that case on February 9, 1988, pp. 1-10 supports this conclusion. 
If Cornish was not in need of fee title, and not entitled to one, 
why was Cornish trying to take a fee title? As a party to this 
action, I believed then and told Mr. Preston that Cornish was 
acting in bad faith and/or fraudulently. He would not make this 
argument when it should have been made. Related condemnation 
cases were heard in 1986. 
36. A hearing was held October 8, 1986 concerning the need 
for immediate occupancy. I had to insist Mr. Preston protect 
Roller's fee title and only allow an easement. 
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37. Mr. Preston laid an inadequate foundation to defend 
Cornish Town's claim under U.C.A. §78-34-9 for immediate 
occupancy. Only a few defenses can be raised to contest 
condemnation. They include fraud, bad faith, misuse of public 
funds, and so forth. Mr. Preston should have known this, as he 
was so advised by opposing counsel and the court. For some 
reason, he would not argue those things against Cornish in this 
legal setting. I believe he had conflicts of interest, the 
breadth and depth of which have only been partially revealed so 
far. 
38. Mr. Preston stated at the end of paragraph 3 of his 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's (Cornish Town's) Motion 
to Dismiss that "Plaintiffs (Rollers) did not need to allege 
fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion (because Rollers) are 
merely attempting to prove that the land to be taken is totally 
unsuitable for the use for which it is to be condemned." Yet, 
because the hearing was a question of immediate occupancy, under 
§78-34-9, it was important that he allege bad faith by the city 
to protect Roller rights, as shown by the following exchange from 
the October 8, 1986 transcript, page 38: 
Mr. Martineau: It's our burden to make a prima facie 
case. I think it is your burden to prove fraud or that 
type of thing. 
The Court: That's right. 
Mr. Preston: Your honor, for the record, I am not 
alleging fraud. Did you say fraud? 
Mr. Martineau: That, along with an abuse of discretion 
or a waste of public funds is one of the grounds, and 
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that's not an issue here, I don't think. You haven't 
pleaded it, and I don't think it is an issue. 
Mr. Preston: I wouldn't accuse these gentlemen of 
fraud, but I would say that probably they've mistaken 
certain elements which I intend to prove. 
(October 8, 1986 Tr. Condemnation Hearing, p. 38.) 
Two days later, the Judge made these observations: 
The Court: In addition, I think there has been some 
misconstruing the Court's role under Section §78-34-9, 
which is what this is about, a request for occupancy 
pending the final determination of the action. And in 
so doing our Supreme Court, in quoting other cases and 
so forth, has stated that "It may be said to be a 
general rule that unless a corporation exercising the 
power of imminent domain acts in bad faith or is guilty 
of oppression, its discretion in the selection of land 
will not be interfered with. The degree of necessity 
or the extent to which the property will advance the 
public purpose the courts have nothing to do with. 
That is not the role of the court. When the use is 
public, the necessity or expediency of the 
appropriation of the particular property is not subject 
of judicial cognizance. The necessity is for the 
condemnor and not for the courts to decide, and the 
decision of such condemnor is final as long as it acts 
reasonably and in good faith." 
So that is all I can inquire into. I can't take and 
come out of my chair and occupy the town council's 
position and say, "I don't like your judgment. I don't 
like what you're doing. This is totally a bad way to 
go. I would do it some other way." I can't take my 
seat and go down there and tell them that and 
substitute my position for theirs. That's there 
responsibility and I can't interfere with it, and 
that's why I say, based on some of the testimony—and I 
let in a good deal that went to that issue, that I 
think because that was not relevant, and insofar as it 
is, I'll not consider it. There were several 
objections based on that. (Oct. 10, 1986 Tr. Hearing 
for immediate occupancy p. 454, 455). 
39. George Preston had been told by me that there was bad 
faith and fraud by the Cornish Town board. He refused to press 
the issue and has not explained why. Most of the rest of this 
Affidavit (at least the next eight pages) details what was or 
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could have been known by Plaintiff, but was not used in Koller 
interests. 
40. The acts of fraud committed by Cornish Town or its 
counsel include each of these items, which I told or documented 
to Mr. Preston: 
a. Using water tests from waters other than the 
Pearson and Griffiths Springs to determine nitrate levels in 
these two springs. There were no nitrate tests of these two 
springs before 1977, but the town introduced tests prior to that 
time as if they were actual tests of these two springs, when in 
actuality, other sources of water were used by the town. 
b. Mr. Martineau and the Town of Cornish inferred to 
the Court October 8, 1986 that the Pearson and Griffith Springs 
were the only sources of water the town had used since 1938, and 
had served the town well. (Tr. p6) The fact was that the major 
sources of Cornish Town's water were the Kofoed Spring, the 
Pitcher Drain, and the town well. 
c. The town hid studies by its engineers showing 
there were other viable sources of water at less cost: 
(1) Cornish minutes of 7-01-81, page 218A. These 
minutes were sanitized from the town's minutes obtained by Koller 
until later in the discovery process in the civil rights action. 
Mr. Preston could have obtained them by prompt action early on. 
The minutes say that Vaughn Hansen, the town engineer, said the 
Kofoed Spring could be developed and supply the whole town with a 
supply of good water for $30,000. 
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(2) B.R.A.G. file of 6-09-81, pp. 9-12 contain a 
letter from Vaughn Hansen to Mayor Paul McKnight listing the cost 
of developing the Rofoed Spring. 
(3) B.R.A.G. file 3-12-85, p. 317, contains a 
memo from Bryan Dixon of B.R.A.G. to Lamar Tarbet, Cornish Town 
Council regarding original letters from Vaughn Hansen with a map 
of the town's water system, stating, "Bruce King (my boss) said 
these could be kept confidential if your attorney wishes, so I 
would like to keep the copies. . .See you Wednesday. BM 
d. The town had their engineer do studies 
specifically repudiating his previous studies to indicate there 
were no other practical sources of water: 
(1) Cornish minutes 6-6-85, pp. 586&7. "Mayor 
Buxton read a letter from Mr. George Preston on behalf of his 
client. . Mayor Buxton noted that alternative sources of water as 
mentioned in the water was (sic) Mr. Roller's idea. The mayor 
did not feel that Mr. Roller was interested in a good substantial 
water source for the community. He felt that Mr. Roller was only 
thinking of himself. It was felt that this letter was both 
insulting and intimidating. The only reason the other water 
sources were considered were to fulfill the requirements for a 
B.R.A.G. community development block grant. 
(2) Cornish minutes 4-18-84, pp. 447, 459A, is a 
study by Vaughn Hansen repudiating his former studies to justify 
a B.R.A.G. grant to prosecute and finance lawsuits against 
Roller. 
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(3) P. 2, Alternative I of the above-referenced 
study: "Assumes that required protection zones around the 
springs can be acquired. . .without cost to Cornish." This shows 
the city intended to steal Roller's property rights without 
paying Roller through court procedure. 
(4) B.R.A.G. file 10-01-84, p. 538, contains a 
study for Cornish by Bryan Dixon, and on page 2 provides: "The 
chief unanswered question, and the one addressed here, is whether 
regulation of the farmer's application of nitrate fertilizer 
would be valid exercise of the police power. If not, the town 
would be forced by economic considerations to pursue other 
sources of culinary water." 
e. The town and Bryan Dixon of B.R.A.G. falsified 
community development block grant applications for federal 
grants. They admit in one application they applied the previous 
year to obtain funds for legal fees to enforce an ordinance. 
They applied for funding for "reverse osmosis systems" when they 
had no intention of installing one. They said they had no funds 
to develop the town's water system, when in fact, they did have 
the funds and were hiding them. Here is the evidence Mr. Preston 
should have obtained and used: 
(1) B.R.A.G. file 4-05-84, p. 416. Cornish 
application for a community development block grant (C.D.B.G.) 
for 1984: "In December 1977, the Utah Bureau of Public Water 
Supplies began to find nitrate levels in the Griffith Spring 
water which exceed the primary maximum contaminate level of 10.0 
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ppm. By August 1979, the levels in both springs were high enough 
that samples from the distribution system exceeded the 10.0 ppm 
limit on nitrates. The problem results from heavy chemical 
fertilizing on the farmland above and around the springs, and the 
town attempted to regulate the nitrate applications. The farmer 
who owns the land ciround the springs has been unwilling to reduce 
his fertilizing and forced the town to begin litigation for 
access to the springs, for rights to the water, and to enforce 
their set-back ordinances." 
(2) Cornish minutes 7-11-84, p. 473B. This is a 
resolution by the Town Board to target Rollers. 
(a) "The Mayor of Cornish is hereby 
authorized to file formal complaint and institute legal 
proceedings against Evan O. and Marlene B. Roller to prevent the 
application of nitrogen fertilizer to the recharge areas of the 
Griffith and Pearson Springs." 
(b) "The Mayor of Cornish is hereby further 
authorized to retain and employ such persons whose scientific 
knowledge may help to establish that surface applied fertilizer 
in the recharge areas of the Griffiths and Pearson Springs is 
contaminating with an unusually high nitrate count the water the 
Town of Cornish obtains from the Griffith and Pearson Springs for 
culinary purposes." 
Note: Roller only farms a fifth of the 
drainage area of the Griffiths Spring which has the highest 
nitrate problem. The town did not target those who farm the 
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other four-fifths. It is also evident they did not, as of 7-11-
84, establish what was causing the nitrate in the water. The 
town had done no studies and ran no tests. Rollers had done 
tests, which showed they (Rollers) were taking more nitrogen from 
the soil than they were applying. Rollers7 tests showed Rollers 
were not the problem, but the town ignored those tests. 
(3) Cornish minutes 5-2-84, p. 476A. Mayor Myler 
letter to Bruce Ring, written by Bryan Dixon regarding B.R.A.G. 
grant and Evan Roller protesting it because their real intent was 
to use the funds to finance lawsuits against Evan Roller. "As 
you are aware, we are facing a real health threat in Cornish if 
nitrate levels in our spring water are not reduced. We simply do 
not have the financial means to install valves, purchase land, 
redevelop Pearson Spring, and install fencing at Griffith Spring, 
all at the same time. We know what we need to do, but we cannot 
afford to do it. Therefore, I was very disappointed to learn 
that Cornish was not funded by the Investment Strategy 
Committee. The landowner who may be the source of the nitrate in 
our springs is aggressive and affluent. He is willing and able 
to challenge us in court on practically every move. It was this 
fact, I understand, which persuaded the Investment Strategy 
Committee to bypass Cornish's C.D.B.G. request. We would like to 
avoid litigation if at all possible." The fact is, litigation 
was the purpose for which Cornish applied for the funds—to 
enforce its ordinance. It tried to use a court order to keep 
Evan Roller from farming his farm.J 
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(4) B.R.A.G. file 1-24-85, p. 448. B.R.A.G. 
attachment to application for Community Development Block Grant, 
Item 10, B.R.A.G. file p. 451B. "The town sought a C.D.B.G. in 
1984 to regulate the application of nitrate fertilizer". 
f. The town and Bryan Dixon concealed funds the town 
had in order to obtain Federal grants to prosecute its case 
against Rollers. 
(1) Cornish tape transcript, 12-05-84, pp. 33-51: 
P. 33. "Lamar: The reason I brought it up is, I 
am trying to look at what Evan is thinking. Now 
he's failed on the Kofoed and Elwood. And these 
other little springs. So what is he going to go 
after this year? It's going to be Trenton or he's 
going to hook up on to Lewiston. So, we are going 
to cut him off at the pass, see. 
(Page 41.) Verl: With $70,000 in the bank. 
Lamar: That's why I said that Bryan. If we have 
a bunch of money in the bank, we really don't 
qualify for Farmers Loan. We're talking about 
poverty. 
Bryan: It's interesting. We don't have the 
criteria, either, to ask "how much money do you 
have in the bank.?" 
Lamar: Really? 
A.J.: We shouldn't have mentioned that, should 
we? 
Bryan: I won't say anything. 
(Page 42) A.J.: We have only talked about 
reverse osmosis really for about the last nine 
months very seriously, and we have nursed that 
$70,000 because we assumed it was going to take a 
big chunk of that to redevelop the Pearson Springs 
to meet State health requirements. 
(Page 43) Verl: What does it do to our 
situation, in your eyes, when we have $70,000? 
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Bryan: In my eyes, I've got to ignore it 
personally. 
g. Cornish minutes 1-02-85, p. 527. The town holds a 
public meeting for purposes of a B.R.A.G. grant. It was a 
"canned" meeting with a limit of 3 minutes per person. "Larry 
Pitcher said that he agreed that the water should take first 
priority and that reverse osmosis be the first thing done to 
deliver potable water. Mayor Buxton said that the council was 
considering both reverse osmosis and some plumbing at the 
chlorinator house." 
(1) Cornish minutes 1-02-85, p. 533. At a 
Cornish public meeting the town council voted, "Mr. Simmonds 
moved that the Mayor be authorized to apply for a C.D.B.G. to 
install reverse osmosis in the homes of Cornish. . .all members 
of the council voted in the affirmative." 
(2) B.R.A.G. file 1-24-85. B.R.A.G. attachment 
to application for a Community Development Block Grant, Item 10, 
B.R.A.G. file P.451B. "The town has investigated reverse osmosis 
and obtained several bids. This solution does not involve the 
farmer, and he would be unable to delay its implementation 
through legal challenges." 
(3) Cornish minutes 2-28-85, p. 550. Bruce King, 
Executive Director of B.R.A.G., letter to Mayor Buxton: "On 
behalf of the B.R.A.G. Investment Strategy Committee, it is my 
pleasure to notify you that your project, water system 
improvements (reverse osmosis), has been recommended for a 
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$43,000 Community Development Block Grant for fiscal year 1985. 
Once again, our congratulations!" 
(4) Town council executive session 12-5-84, p. 
48: 
Bob: Now aren't we using this reverse osmosis as 
just a delaying period until we can get the springs and get them 
cleared up and redeveloped? 
Ann: Urn Huh, 
(5) After the award of the grant, the town 
switched the project from reverse osmosis to a condemnation 
action against Roller. Thus, Cornish obtained funds by deceit to 
accomplish its purposes in a lawsuit against Roller. 
41. In 1990, Evan Roller convinced a new mayor to examine 
the Pearson Spring and redevelop it to eliminate the 
contamination with which it was plagued. With Roller providing 
most of the cost, over $30,000 of construction work, the Pearson 
Spring has been developed in accordance with State regulations. 
The Pearson Spring presently flows about 10 gpm and the Griffith 
Spring flows between 2 and 4 gpm. The town has now received 
large grants of funds with which to seek other sources of water. 
42. Given the volume of this documentation of fraud by 
Cornish, I could testify that by not raising a fraud claim 
against Cornish on my behalf, Plaintiff did not meet an obvious 
duty of care to Roller. 
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43. I believe the following items show that the Plaintiff 
and George Preston had conflicts of interest which could explain 
Mr. Preston's willingness not to be aggressive on my behalf: 
a. Verl Buxton is an officer and stockholder of the 
Lewiston State Bank. The Plaintiff's lawfirm is or has been 
affiliated with the Lewiston State Bank as counsel, beginning at 
least in the 1930's and continuing in the 1940's, 1950's, and 
probably into the present. V. H. Harris represented Lewiston 
State Bank in the 1960's, 1970's, and 1980's. J. M. Chambers 
represented Lewiston State Bank in the late 1980's and 1990's. 
The Plaintiff firm purchased 50 shares of Lewiston State Bank 
stock from a deceased shareholder's estate, some of which is 
still held by the lawfirm and some of which is owned by B. H. 
Harris. (See Plaintiff's answer to Defendant's First Set of 
Interrogatories and First Request for Production of Documents, 
nos. 10 and 11.) 
b. Plaintiff and Mr. Preston resisted and refused to 
pursue the seriousness of Cornish Town's abuse, threats and 
defamation by Mr. Buxton, which was directed at Roller, including 
allegations by the town council, Mr. Buxton, County Attorney, and 
to the newspaper, false allegations that Mr. Roller had 
threatened to shoot Mr. Buxton, and threats of violence against 
Marlene Roller and Dan Roller in public meetings, including 
taking a tape recorder and taking a swing. None of this was 
considered "all that serious11 by Mr. Preston. 
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c. Cornish's attorney Jody Burnett represented George 
Preston in a Cache County v. Thatcher case, while Mr. Preston's 
law partner, Joseph Chambers, represented Smithfield City against 
Thatchers in the sajne case, all according to a July 20, 1989 
letter to the Rollers. 
d. Mr. Preston wanted to drop A. J. Simmonds (the 
,fA.J.fl quoted in some minutes above, now the late A.J. Simmonds) 
from the civil rights action because Mr. Simmonds had hired 
Attorney Gordon Low to represent him, and Mr. Preston said 
Simmonds was going to have to pay his attorney fees himself and 
he couldn't afford that. Roller declined, as Mr. Simmonds was 
the principal agent of the town in instigating the lawsuits 
against Rollers and the ordinance endeavoring to take Roller's 
property without compensation. He did this as the town recorder, 
not a councilman. See A. J. Simmonds, Cornish Minutes Index. I 
believe Mr. Preston and A.J. Simmonds could have been drinking 
buddies. 
e. Mr. Preston wanted to drop Bryan Dixon and 
B.R.A.G. from the civil rights case. Bryan Dixon and B.R.A.G. 
were principal agents in funding, directing, coordinating, 
researching, and^advising the town to take Roller's property by 
the police powers without compensation. Bruce Ring, executive 
director of B.R.A.G. was involved. Mr. Preston has billed 
Rollers for one hour for a conference with Bruce Ring. Mr. 
Preston has represented Mr. Ring in other matters. See June 27, 
1985 billing re June 11, 1985 "conference with Bruce Ring—$70". 
26 
44. Roller had to suggest and insist on discovery, rather 
than Mr. Preston instigating very much, if any, discovery. 
Initially, Roller lacked understanding and knowledge, and 
apparently Mr. Preston also lacked knowledge of certain facets of 
the case, including the difference between appropriated and 
contract water rights, State regulations regarding municipal 
water systems, the usefulness of an expert witness in the water 
case, and the facts found in the records of the State Health 
Department, Cornish Town, and B.R.A.G. Important facts from 
these records would have helped understand water sources, uses of 
the water, tests of water, quality and quantity data, and studies 
of the water system. Mr. Preston was reluctant to comply with 
Roller's request to discover the town's records and B.R.A.G.'s 
file on Cornish. His reluctance amounted to abandoning the duty 
of care he owed Roller. His reluctance gave the town ample time 
to sanitize its records before Rollers were able to obtain them. 
The town did most of its business in executive sessions that hid 
many facts regarding the town's water system. 
45, It would have been very helpful early in the water case 
to have had the studies by Vaughn Hansen and the minutes of the 
town regarding the potential of the Rofoed Spring. The minutes 
of the July 1, 1981 meeting with Vaughn Hansen regarding the 
development of the Rofoed Spring were hidden from Rollers until 
they were found among other papers produced in discovery in the 
civil rights action. The Hansen studies Rollers were able to 
obtain were obtained by Rollers from the B.R.A.G. file when they 
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walked in unannounced to the B.R.A.G. offices and asked to see 
and copy the file. B.R.A.G. complied with the request. The file 
was later sanitized, and to this day, Roller has been unable to 
obtain a full copy of the town's 1985 C.D.B.G. application. 
46. November 15, 1988, Mr. Preston did not discuss with 
Roller a motion he knew about in advance. Before the hearing, 
Mr. Preston and Mr. Burnett had discussed a motion to be made by 
Mr. Burnett regarding relocating the 3/4-inch service connection 
specified in the contract and deed granted by Pearsons. Roller 
was not advised in advance of Mr. Burnett's intent, but Mr. 
Preston admitted the issue had not been brought up in Court but 
Mr. Burnett had "passed it by". 
47. The Court and attorneys discussed ?t&& relocating the 
tap without a specific motion being filed. Unfortunately, the 
Judge agreed with Attorney Burnett's argument. Mr. Preston put 
on a weak defense, failed to point out the inconsistencies with 
the 1983 bench ruling. He did not adequately address the fact 
that moving the connection up the hill reduced the pressure and 
affected flow rates. The fact that this issue had been fully 
adjudicated in 1983 and should not have been an issue between the 
parties was not mentioned in the hearing. The adjudication in 
1983 was before Judge Christopherson. 
48. In his argument, Mr. Preston failed to argue that 
Cornish Town acknowledged in its Supreme Court brief that 
Pearsons were entitled to a 3/4-inch tap located at their house, 
and had deeded to Cornish to participate in a municipal culinary 
water system to get better quality but not to change izo location 
of the service connection. 
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49. Mr. Preston did not argue the relation between the 
town's water system, State regulations and Roller's water rights. 
The point he should have made was that the deed and contract 
granted by Pearsons and accepted by the town, required the town 
to pipe water to a specified point from the town's system for 
grantor's use. The four-fifths granted to the city had been 
subject to the reserved right in Pearsons to use all the water. 
The only limitation on the amount of use was for the purposes 
stated in the deed, and the amount which would flow through a 
3/4" tap or service connection located at the home in which Lars 
Pearson lived. If that tap was moved to another point, it 
changed the terms of the contract and did violence to the terms 
of the reserved water right. If the town could move the service 
connection to a more distant point, it forces the grantors, 
instead of the town, to pipe the water to a location specified by 
the deed. 
50. Mr. Preston also failed to argue that water hookups, 
taps, or service connections (as they are variously referred to) 
are physically located where the water user connects to the line 
of the water supplier. Utah Safe Drinking Water Regulation 1.9 
defines a service connection as a means by which a dwelling or 
water user obtains water from the supplier's distribution system. 
51. In addition, I pointed out to Mr. Preston that Utah 
Safe Drinking Water Regulations 12.7 and 12.7.1 require service 
taps to be made so as to not jeopardize the sanitary quality of 
the system's water; and that regulation 12.7.2 says that the 
portion of the service line urider the control of the water 
supplier is considered to be part of the distribution system and 
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"shall comply with all requirements given herein." Also, that 
Regulation 12.7.4 required all facilities connected to a public 
water supply to be in conformance with the Utah Plumbing Code. 
Mr. Preston's .argument was weak, failed and required a second 
appeal to the Supreme Court to enforce what had already been 
decided and/^ what should have been an obvious argument. 
52. Roller repeatedly asked Mr. Preston to ask for attorney 
fees to Roller for having to bring various actions, but Mr. 
Preston would not do so. Prior to the oral arguments before the 
Utah Supreme Court on the 3/4-inch Tap Appeal, when Mr. Preston's 
brief did not ask for the fees and when reminded of this, Mr. 
Preston told me, "the Supreme Court doesn't like to award 
attorney fees". 
53. As a result of the telephone conference and hearing 
with the attorneys, the present judge, Gordon Low, has used the 
fact that the issue of attorney fees was not raised before the 
Supreme Court as a reason to dismiss Roller's motion for attorney 
Fi sAer 
fees. I was told by Mr. Preston that this telephone conference 
and hearing, was to be "only a scheduling conference." 
54. I have been present and involved throughout these 
proceedings and can explain historical facts, what I told Mr. 
Preston, and what Roller asked Mr. Preston to do. I believe a 
fact-finder can also understand that many of the malpractice 
issues are obvious enough that the duty of care can be shown by 
the matters referred to in this Affidavit. The Utah Supreme 
Court ruled in its decision that when the trial court granted 
Jody Burnett's motion, Mr. Roller's due process rights were 
denied. Mr. Preston was responsible for allowing this to happen, 
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costing Roller many dollars in fees, fees which Mr. Preston did 
not ask to be reimbursed in drafting the appeal brief. 
55. Mr. Preston did not meet his duty of care for Roller in 
connection with the entry of the Amended Judgment and Decree in 
Case 18267, after remand from the Supreme Court. Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered and all 
signed by the Judge December 15, 1988, after a hearing November 
15, 1988. The proposed pleadings were served on Mr. Preston 
November 30, 1988. No objection was filed by Mr. Preston until 
after the pleadings were signed by the Court December 15. And 
then, the objection was filed in the name of Bryan Fisher as if 
it were signed by him, but it appears to have actually been 
signed by George Preston, December 15. He only had 10 days from 
December 1 to file the objection, but filed it December 15, 1988 
at 4:32 p.m. Judge Christc^ jpferson signed the Judgment earlier on 
December 15, 1988, probably before Preston filed the objection. 
Mr. Preston was too late in this filing, yet he billed Roller for 
10.75 hours between December 5 and December 15, $860 for this 
work. He later transferred this $860 billing to the 3/4-inch Tap 
Appeal account, No. 204-10, October 26, 1989. The original 
billing appeared-: under Client Code ROL204-03 (Civil Rights) on 
December 28, 1988. 
56. The signature of ffM. Bryan Fisher" on the objection 
filed by Mr. Preston December 15, 1988, on page 160 of the Court 
record in case 790018267, is distinctly different than "M. Bryan 
Fisher" on page 49, which is a pleading that really was signed by 
M. Bryan Fisher. Mr. Preston appears to have been willing to put 
another attorney's name on the objection without so indicating it 
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was not actually signed by Bryan Fisher, file it late, and bill 
Roller. 
Dated this 18th day of August, 1995, 
EVAN 0. ROLLER 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) s. 
COUNTY OF CACHE) 
Subscribed and sworn to before 
1995, by Evan O. Roller. 
RAYMOND N. MALOUr, J . l 
HOWfPUBUC • SVTE OF UTAH 
150 EAST 200 NORTH #D 
LOGAN, UTAH 84321 
COMM. EXP. MAY 21,1996 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of August, 1995, a 
true .and correct copy of the foregoing, Affidavit of Evan Roller, 
was mailed postage prepaid to the following: 
Glenn C. Hanni 
Peter H. Christensen 
Attorney at Law 
6th Floor Boston Building 
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Addendum 2 
Exhibits A through E from Koller Respecting Summary Judgment 
A. Summons - late R 176 
B. Interrogatory Answers, Plaintiff Admits Only $79,933.31 
Received R 177-183 
C. Letter December 7, 1994, informal discovery R 185 
D. Letters from Koller to Preston 
September 23, 1990 R 187 
June 7, 1991 R 189 
August 13, 1991 R 194 
E. Letter from Plaintiffs attorney September 1, 1992 
("all of the billings") R 199 
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IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT CqgSW&F (*&& .-SffATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
fPRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C., 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
(EVAN 0- KOLLER, 
Defendant. 
ON & H O G G A N , P C 
ArrowNfrs AT CAW 
** ^CST CENTC* 
P O 60X 5 2 5 
SAN UTAH 6-*32>O025 
<aO«l75i 1551 
R O N T O N O F F I C E : 
123 CAST MAIN 
P O bOx I 15 
ONION. UTAH & 0 3 7 
(THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE~NAB£EL-£L r-KOLLER: 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer in 
[writing to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the above-
entitled Court, whose address is 140 North 100 West, Logan, Utah 
84321, and to serve upon or mail to OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C., Thomas L. 
jWillmore, Plaintiff's attorneys, 56 West Center, P.O. Box 525, 
Logan, Utah, 84321, a copy of said Answer, within twenty (20) days 
after service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail to do so, judgment will be taken against you for 
the relief demanded in said Complaint, which has been filed with 
the Clerk of the said Court and a copy of which is hereto annexed 
and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this / ^A day of October, 1992. 
/lA(^M<A^/^ 
Defendant's Address: 
12693 North 5800 West 
Cornish, Utah 84308 
/Attorneys for Plaintiff 
56 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
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Glenn C. Hanni, #A1327 
Peter H. Christensen, #5453 
STRONG & KANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
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IN THE FIRST cj-rvsmx* COURT FOR CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




EVAN 0. KOLLER, 
Defendant and 
Counterclaimant. 
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS TO 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND FIRST 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS 
Civil No. 92-690 ^ ( 3 ~ ® ' 
) 
Plaintiff and counterclaim defendant, Preston & Chambers, 
P.C., by and through counsel, hereby responds to defendant and 
counterclaimant Evan Koller's First Set of Interrogatories and 
First Request for Production of Documents as follows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Identify each name, present mailing 
address and the inclusive period(s) of association for every 
director and for every shareholder of the plaintiff law firm for 
all periods between 1 November 1979 and 1 September 1993. 
20462&Y1 
ANSWER: Burton H. Harris, Logan, Utah, 1979-1990; George W. 
Preston, Logan, Utah - Garden City, Utah, 1979-Present; Robert W. 
Gutke, Logan, Utah, 1979-1986; Thomas L. Willmore, Logan, Utah, 
1965-1989; Joseph M. Chambers, Providence, Utah, 1979-Present. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Specify the name and Present mailing 
address of each attorney, named in answer to No. 1, who performed 
any service for Evan 0. Koller between 1 November 1979 and 30 
November 1990. 
ANSWER: All of the above-mentioned attorneys, with the 
exception possibly of Robert.W. Gutke, were involved to some extent 
with Evan Koller. It is unlikely that Mr. Gutke participated in 
any discussion regarding Evan Roller's matters. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Specify the dates and amounts paid by 
Evan 0. Koller or Koller Corporation to the plaintiff and/or any of 
its directors or shareholders at any time between 1 November 1979 
and thereafter. If any payments were not deposited by the 
plaintiff corporation, specify who deposited said payments. 
ANSWER: 
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f r t ' l t « " » collection 
3,000.00 
15^00.00
 2 9 4 
8,000.00 - C K 
5,000.00 
2,312.84 
1,486.65 i -.-. 
The Bassett. and White cases were suits brought by our firm 
against two trespassers on Evan Koller's land. The court granted 
damages in each case and partial collection was made by our firm 
and Evan Koller concluded the collections. Costs were charged. 
Second Appeal: 
KOL20110: 3-8-89 " ^ s w a s ] 
10-4-89 
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documents are believed to be on file with the Secretary of State, 
with a copy at the law offices of Preston & Chambers. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Describe in detail to what extent any 
member of the plaintiff law firm has ever served as counsel for 
Lewiston State Bank, any of its officers or directors, or any of 
its major owners. 
ANSWER: George D. Preston represented Lewiston State Bank in 
the 1930's, 40's and 50fs. M. C. Harris represented Lewiston State 
Bank during World War II and following. B. H. Harris represented 
Lewiston State Bank in the 60 !s, 70's and 80's. J. M. Chambers 
represented Lewiston State Bank in the late 80 fs and 90 fs. The 
names of all of the officers, directors and major owners of the 
bank over the years is unknown and therefore it is impossible for 
plaintiff to accurately determine whether the law firm has 
represented these individuals. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11; Specify whether and to what extent any 
member of the plaintiff law firm or members of their immediate 
families have ever held stock in the Lewiston State Bank. 
ANSWER: Preston & Chambers purchased 50 shares of Lewiston 
State Bank stock from a deceased shareholder's estate. B. H. 
Harris owns some of these shares and Preston & Chambers holds the 
remainder. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 12: Specify in detail the nature and extent 
of the affiliation, association, or business relationship between 
2D462anh 1 4 
Verl Buxton and any member of the plaintiff law firm, both past and 
present. 
ANSWER: George D. Preston or George w. Preston may have 
represented Mr. Buxton in the early 1960's. There are no known 
records that exist as to that representation. Evan Koller was made 
aware of this representation early in the lawsuit between Cornish 
Town and Evan Koller. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Specify in detail each and every 
discussion or correspondence you have had with the defendant 
concerning your conflicts of interest in representing the Kollers. 
ANSWER: This question assumes that there are in fact 
conflicts of interest. Plaintiff disputes that any conflicts of 
interest were created through representation of Evan Koller. It is 
plaintiff's belief that its members, specifically George Preston, 
were at all times up front and candid with Mr. Koller regarding 
clients that they represented. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Identify each person you expect to call 
as an expert witness at trial. For each such person: 
(a) State the subject matter(s) to which the expert is 
expected to testify. 
(b) State the substance of the facts and opinions to 
which the expert is expected to testify. 
(c) Summarize the grounds for each opinion. 
20462&Y1 15 
as # Dated this 'O1 day of November, 1993. 
PRESTO>T & ^ CHAMBERS, P.C. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF LoA&- ss. .) 
On the Jg t^ik day of November, 199 3, personally appeared 
before me GEORGE PRESTON, who duly acknowledged to me that he 
signed and executed the foregoing Plaintiff's Answers to 
Defendant's First Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
Documents on behalf of Preston & Chambers, P.C., and that the same 











day of November, 1993 
STRONG & HANNI 
'Glenn^ -C. Hanni 
Peter H. Christensen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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MALOUF LAW OFFICE^ 
150 EAST 200 NORTH, SUITE D 
LOGAN, UTAJ3 84321-4036 
CARL E. MALOUF 
RAYMOND N. MALOUF 
MICHAEL W. IsBELL 
December 7, 1994 
Mr. Glenn Hanni 
Attorney at Law 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Preston v. Koller 
Dear Glenn: 
Enclosed are supplemental responses to Interrogatories. In 
reviewing for this, I realize a lot of information referred to is 
in the documents Koller believes you have. Koller does not think 
he should reproduce documents Preston has or that Preston prepared. 
Koller believes some of Preston's billings asked a second time for 
money already paid. Reviewing for this supplemental reminded 
Koller of just why he was upset at Preston's transfers: He could 
not figure out why the bills were made the way Preston made them, 
and he still can't. Koller has excellent defenses to Preston's 
accounting. 
Even if Koller does not choose to use an expert at trial, he 
can explain the points he wants to make on eminent domain, 
contracts, and the stress related to protracted litigation. Even 
if the issues become limited, we will have a few exciting days in 
front of a jury. 
Since you believe Evan has files Preston wants to see again, 
you may want to make an appointment through me to go to Evan's 
house after you ask for specific items from specific files and 
provide detail of what you wish to see from the files you say 
Koller has. Koller represents the files he took were only the 
civil rights files. 
Likewise, we request a comprehensive list of the files Preston 
has remaining. We would like the opportunity to look through 
these. 
Sineer^iy yours, 
Raymond N. Malouf 
RNM:by 
cc Evan Koller 
Tom Willnore, Esq. 
drhanglenn.rbl 
PHONE (801) 752-9380 
FAX (801) 752-9382 
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EVAN O. ROLLER 
P.O. Box 31 Ph.801-563-5467 
12693 North 5800 West 
Cornish, Utah 84308 
September 23, 1990 
George W. Preston 
Preston & Chambers 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Re: Supreme Court opinion 
Case No. 890020 
Dear George: 
Thanks for your letter and copies of the recent Supreme Court Decision in Case 
No. 890020. Byron Fisher sent us copies also. 
It is noteworthy that the Court's opinion was unanimous that the District Court 
abused its discretion, erred and failed to safeguard the due process rights of the Rollers. This 
is not the only time the Rollers have been abused in that Court. The Court is made up of people 
and in the final analysis it is the individuals that participate in the legal process that failed to 
safeguard Rollers' rights. It has been very traumatic, frustrating, and expensive for the Rollers. 
The Rollers have been injured. Who is responsible? 
If you recall, you advised me not to appeal the case. Had we not appealed, the 
Town would have then moved to have the conclusions of law and judgement conform to the 
findings of fact, the Judge would have seized the opportunity, and Rollers would have been 
robbed of their water. 
Jody Burnett is always quoting the rules of procedure to the Court. Why wasn't 
the rule 52(b) quoted to the Court at the proceeding when the motion was made? 
To this date the fact has never been placed before any of the various levels of the 
Courts that the deeded contract mandates the location of the tap where the Town is required to 
deliver the water for culinary, domestic, human drinking and stockwatering purposes. The 
service connection or tap is where the water user connects on to the supply line of the water 
supplier. The Judge ruled after taking evidence in the hearing in 1983 that the Town had to 
deliver the water to the box behind the Roller home where everything goes out from. The place 
where the service connection has always been. It was adjudicated. The Town acknowledged in 
Fillmore's brief (red cover) to the Supreme Court that it was the Town's responsibility to deliver 
the water to that box behind the home. 
It is simply an impossibility for the Town to deliver the water to the Roller home 
but require Rollers to connect on somewhere else. The connection is where the water is 
delivered. 
George Preston 
September 23, 1990 
Pase -2-
A clear understanding of the water rights and responsibilities of the respective 
parties has never been clearly spelled out before the Courts. Because of this the courts are 
floundering around in this legal morass. If the attorneys are going to argue water rights cases 
before the courts they should understand water rights law. They should also understand State 
health regulations if they should apply. If they don't understand the law and regulations they 
should direct their clients to someone who does and will effectively argue the law before the 
courts. 
It was Judge Christofferson who pointed out in 1983 that the Griffiths Spring and 
Pearson Spring tap rights were not appropriated rights but were deeded contract rights. He 
refused to quantify the flow reserved to the Rollers in gallons as you tried to do but ruled the 
use was governed by the reservations and grants in the deeds. He also pointed out that Kollers 
were not the appropriators of these two rights but that the Town was the appropriator and owner 
of the water. But the deeds reserve to Kollers the use of the water for the enumerated purposes 
and the Town must deliver it to them. This fact makes the Town a water supplier and as they 
have more than 15 service connections State regulations require the Town's water system to 
comply with the regulations for public drinking water systems. 
The l/5th right in the Pearson Spring which was never given to Cornish Town is 
an appropriated right under the State's laws pertaining to appropriated rights. The fact that 
Pearsons required "all" water to be metered—not just that which was delivered to the Pearson 
home—shows an effort to safeguard the l/5th interest. The water which was uncollected from 
Pearson Spring and flowed down the hollow became a part of the Butler Hollow water rights 
belonging to Kollers as pointed out by Dee Hansen, State Water Engineer. The rights pertaining 
to the l/5th interest are not the same as those of the contract rights. These rights are spelled out 
in the Kimball decree on appropriated water rights. To this day, the Town is still trying to steal 
the l/5th interest of Kollers because these rights have not been clearly placed before the Courts. 
The water line which Kollers installed up the hill in 1979 and the Town refused 
to use or pay for is designed with various outlets to sendee the l/5th interest. The Town must, 
as Fillmore argued before the Supreme Court, deliver the water for the tap right to the Koller 
home in a separate line. 
There were two homes standing on the Pearson property when Kollers bought it. 
The Pearsons at one time divided the property up among the respective owners. Kollers still 
have two separate rights to the waters of the Pearson Spring and they have no intention of 
relinquishing either of those rights because they have used, do now use, and will need to use 
them in the future. 
George Preston 
September 23, 1990 
Page -3-
Suppose Kollers want to install a 500 cow dairy as some of the farmers have in 
Cornish. Their deed with the Town reserves the right to use the water for stockwatering 
purposes. The Town knows this and that is why they want to quantify the amount for some 
apartment with two people in it. Vaughn Hansen and Jody Burnett argued .8 gpm would be 
sufficient. 
The Supreme Court has now vindicated the position that the District Court 
committed procedural errors. Who are the individuals responsible? 
Why wasn't rule 52(b) quoted before the Court at the time of the motion? Why 
wasn't it pointed out to the Court that the Court had previously ruled, and the Town had 
acknowledged, the Town had to deliver the water to the box behind the home? Indeed, the deed 
requires the Town to -deliver it there. It then becomes impossible for Kollers to receive it 
elsewhere. The simple fact remains, all service connections or taps are where the water user 
receives the water from the water supplier. 
Why wasn't this presented before the Court in five minutes at the time of the 
motion instead of going through the gauntlet of appeals? Further, why wasn't it pointed out in 
the appeals? 
If Jody Burnett and Judge Christofferson (who I understand associates with Jody's 
father at the golf course continually) followed improper procedure in this case, who should pay 
the costs thereof? I noted Jody's father attended the hearings. 
The whole mess has a terrible odor. This case has been festering since back in 
the 1970's. In all this time the legal system of Utah has not been able to clearly and concisely 
discover and delineate what Rollers' water rights are. Kollers have been injured. They are tired 
and disgusted with the whole stinking mess. 
If there is anything you can do to recover the costs from those who caused the 
injury please let me know. 
Very truly yours, 
Evan O. Koller 
EVAN O. KOLLER 
P.O. Box 31 Ph. 801-563-5467 
12693 North 5800 West 
Cornish, Utah 84308 
June 7, 1991 
Attorney George Preston 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Dear George: 
It is noted in your hand writing on a billing sent to 
Evan 0. Koller on May 31, 1991 that "I am getting to rhe point that 
I must take action to collect this account." That is your decision 
to make but it may prove to be very unwise. For if you do I will 
be forced to file one horrendous malpractice suit in counterclaim. 
It is understandable that you may feel you are entitled 
to these fees. However, there is generally different sides to an 
issue and you ought to take a look at this mess from where Rollers 
now stand. 
Most of our problems in this case have arisen because of 
your lack of knowledge of water law, State regulations relating to 
municipal culinary systems, and an undertstanding of rhe nature of 
Rollers' water rights. If a complete and correct understanding of 
these issues had been placed before the court in the early stages 
of this long legal mess it should have been resolved ten years ago. 
And it should have avoided most of the time, cost, hashing and 
rehashing of the issues before the various courts down through the 
years. 
Your lack of understanding of Rollers water rights under 
appropriated law, contract law, and the nature of the contract deed 
granted by several individuals to the Town of Cornish has greatly 
complicated the matter and been exploited by the opposition. 
Rollers went into this knowing what their rights were but 
not knowing or understanding how the law and regulations applied 
thereto. Your advice that the l/5th interest had to flow down 
Butler Hollow to preserve the rioht is false. It has mislead us 
all. 
The fact is, there was not total agreement among the five 
individuals owning the Pearson Spring and property which it 
serviced. That is evidenced in the contract by the fact Marie did 
not and would not sign the deed and Pearsons required ALL water to 
be metered. There were two homes on the Pearson property. What if 
Marie, or Randolph, or Wesley, or Lawrence had moved into the 
second home or had built another home on the property how would 
they have divided the water? The Town agreed to pipe the water to 
the Lars Pearson home but no further. Any distribution beyond that 
point would have been Pearsons' 
George Preston 
June 7, 1S91 
Page -2-
responsibility. Now suppose Marie had wanted to take her water and 
her share of the property and separate it from the rest how would 
they divide the water and protect the respective rights? How could 
Pearsons assure that the Town delivered the l/5th interest not 
granted? That is why the requirement was placed in the deed that 
ALL water was to be metered whether going to the Town or each of 
the Pearsons. That l/5th interest flowed down both the pipeline 
and the Butler Hollow as all the water in the hollow was not 
collected. There is still water in that hollow today that is not 
.collected. Pearsons reserved the right to USE the water of the 
4/5ths granted "of ONE certain unnamed spring" collected by the 
Town's system. They retained the water rights to all other water 
in the hollow and did use it until 1959 when Kollers bought it from 
Emma Marie Pearson Dobbs. It has been used to this day. The fact 
is, the spring produced so little water it was found Pearsons could 
draw it all and for various reasons the need for meters became 
moot. None were ever installed. The Town got all the water when 
Pearsons, or now Kollers, were not using it and it has been 
beneficial to the Town along with reservoir sites and r-o-w's. 
However, the amount of water supplied to the Town from the 
Griffiths and Pearson Springs was generally very inadequate and 
other sources of water were sought and introduced to supply the 
Town's needs. The Kofoed Spring, the Pitcher drains and the wells 
the Town drilled all provided more water each than the Griffiths 
and Pearson Springs combined. 
The above information should have been discovered and 
kept before the Courts from the outset of this case. Instead the 
Town was allowed to convince the courts that the two little springs 
on the Koller property were the sole sources of their water and 
Kollers were trying to steal it from them. It was not until 
Kollers finally convinced you to help obtain the Town's records 
that the truth of the matter was revealed. Do you remember asking 
the Kollers why they wanted the Town's records? or Brag's records? 
or the the States water records? It was from those records that 
Kollers finally proved the earliest water tests the Town was using 
to show Kollers were causing high nitrate levels in the Pearson and 
Griffiths Springs were not tests of the those two springs but of 
other waters. 
Further, Dee Hansen, State Water Engineer ruled in his 
Memorandum Decision early in the case that all the uncollected 
waters of the Pearson Spring or Butler Hollow area flowed down 
Butler Hollow and became part of Kollers' Butler Hollow rights 
under filing W.U.C. 6716. That is still the case. 
Contract water is not governed by appropriated law and is 
not lost by non-use as appropriated water is. You will note that 
the right to use the water of the Griffiths Spring is not filed on 
by Kollers but is a decreed right in a deed from a Court 
Georae Preston 
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condemnation case. You will also note, as did Judge 
Christofferson, that 4/5ths of the Pearson Spring was given to 
Cornish by 4 of the 5 Pearsons and Cornish is the appropriatcr of 
that water. The grantors of the contract deed reserved the right 
to USE that water and the Town agreed to deliver the water to the 
heme Lars Pearson was living in at the time. The right to use the 
water the four Pearsons deeded to Cornish is "the same situation as 
the Griffiths Spring" Judge Chistofferson ruled and also is not 
filed on by Kollers. It is a deeded contract right governed by the 
terms of the contract. It is appropriated by the Town from the 
State and delivered to Kollers under contract out of the Town's 
municipal system. It is regulated by State and National public 
drinking water regulations as it is owned by the Town and delivered 
by the Town out of a public water system. Why you did not delve 
into this back in 1979 when you, the Kollers, the Cornish Town 
Board, the County Health Department and the State Health Department 
met regarding the issues of this case, you will have to explain. 
You will recall the Kollers had found the Town delivering raw ditch 
water to the users of the system in 1978. To this day you have 
never placed before the courts the Public Drinking Water 
Regulations and their relation to the Koller water rights. Even 
after I had by chance discovered there were such regulations, 
researched them and provided you a copy with the researched 
citations. 
It was Judge Christofferson who stopped you from 
quantifying and limiting by gallons the amount of water Kollers 
could use. Apparently you were going to limit it to one individual 
family or home. How much would you have given each to Lars, 
Randolph, Wesley, Lawrence and Marie? Would they all had to have 
lived in the house Lars Pearson was living in to have received any 
water? How much did you want to limit Kollers to? What criteria 
were you going to -cse? 
Your lack of understanding of the nature of a service 
connection, or service tap, or service hookup and failure to 
explain this to the court led to the necessity of the appeal on the 
issue. Why did you not explain to the Court that service taps, 
connections or hook-ups are where the water user connects to, taps 
into, or hooks up to the distribution system of the supplier? And 
from that point downstream it is the responsibility of the water 
user but from that point upstream it is the responsibility of the 
water supplier and must meet the requirements of the State of Utah 
Public Drinking Water Regulations? Section 1.9 of those 
regulations defines a Service Connection as "The means by vmich a 
dwelling, commercial or industrial establishment, or other water 
user obtains water from the supplier's distribution system. 
Multiple dwelling units such as condominiums or aprartments, shall 
be considered to have multiple connections, Each unit in these 
dwellings shall be 
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considered to have one connection." See also Sections 11.2 and 
12.0.1 on pressures and 12.7.1-4 on service connections and 
distribution line sizing. The regs require the water supplier to 
comply with certain criteria including quality. I gave you this 
information. It should have been placed before the courts at the 
outset of this issue because it is substantially germane. 
The "LAW STUDENT ASSISTANCE RULE" approved by the Utah 
Supreme Court, September, 1977 and amended April 1, 1986 provides 
that law student assistance to law firms is authorized. However, 
Section II (5) of this rule provides that "Such student shall net 
receive any compensation or remuneration of any kind for his 
services from the client en whose behalf he renders service." Do 
you recall how much you billed us for a law student named 
Hutchinson? 
There is more some with much greater weight. 
The Bar Code under TERMINOLOGY states "Fraud" or 
"frudulent" denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive and not 
merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of 
relevant information." 
A legal dictionary defines "FRAUD" as: "intentional 
deception resulting in injury to another. Fraud usually consists 
of a misrepresentation, concealment or nondisclosure of a material 
fact, or at least misleading conduct, devices or contrivance." 
"CONSTRUCTIVE (OR LEGAL) FRAUD comprises all acts, omissions and 
concealments involving breach of equitable or legal duty, or trust 
and resulting in damage to another. It is thus fraud that is 
presumed from the circumstances, without the need for any actual 
proof of intent to defraud." "EXTRINSIC (OR COLLATERAL) FRAUD 
fraud that prevents a party from knowing about his rights or 
defenses or having a fair opportunity to present or litigate them 
at a trial. It is a ground for equitable relief from a judgment. " 
The dictionary goes on and defines FRAUD IN FACT (POSITIVE FRAUD) , 
FRAUD IN LAW, FRAUD IN THE FACTUM, FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT, AND 
INTRINSIC FRAUD. 
The Town and their agents have sought to deceive in many 
instances in this case. Their whole posture has been one of 
deception. Howbeit, you refused to allege fraud in the 
condemnation hearing and the Court ruled that without fraud the 
Court could not interfere with what the Town proposed to do. 
Therefore, the Court was not interested in any evidence pertaining 
to necessity and became antagonistic to any effort to introduce 
such evidence or interfere with the Town's proceeding. 
The Bar Code further states, "Reasonably should know," 
when used in reference to a lawyer, denotes that a lawyer of 
(Q 2 
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reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in 
question." There is no evidence that the lawyers involved in this 
case have claimed to have less than reasonable prudence or 
competence. 
The Utah Supreme Court found that: the action of the First 
District Court and the Motion of Attorney Burnett: deprived the 
Kollers of "Due Process". Kollers are entitled to due process 
under the Constitution and there is considerable federal civil 
rights law on the subject. There is also precedent where judges 
are not immune. 
Utah code 78-51-31 provides for an action against an 
attorney who attempts to deceive a Court and they are liable to the 
injured in the amount of treble damages. 
I would propose to you that we not fight among ourselves 
but that we join in cooperation in obtaining fees, costs and 
damages from those who have caused this action by trying to steal 
Kollers' property and water rights. It is my opinion it will be 
much more productive than fighting between us. 
Think about it and let me know what you want to do. Due 
to the many rain storms we are behind in our farm work and are busy 
right now trying to get our planting and farming done but would 
discuss it with you as soon as scheduling will permit. 
Sincerely yours, 
Evan 0. Koller 
EVAN O. ROLLER 
P.O. Box 31 Ph. 801-563-5467 
12693 North 5800 West 
Cornish, Utah 84308 
August 13, 1991 
Attorney George Preston 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Dear George: 
Thanks for sending a copy of the Utah Supreme Court 
Opinion filed August 1, 1991 in the Condemnation case. It is 
Kollers view that the Court has sustained the strategy of the 
Town's counsel completely. However, it is not surprising in light 
of the record and past judgments of the Utah Supreme Court. 
It does not evidence that Kollers have received the 
benefit of qualified counsel acting in their behalf. The reverse 
is true. 
Utah law, UCA 78-34-4, (2), provides that "Before 
property can be taken it must appear: That the taking is necessary 
to such use;." There are weasel words by the Utah Supreme Court in 
the Fuller Case, which was also tried before Judge Christofferson, 
which weasel words negate the effect of the above statute unless 
bad faith is involved. Judge Christofferson emphasized this ruling 
to you several times as did the opposing counsel at the trial for 
immeadiate occupancy. It is in the transcript. You gave me a copy 
of the Fuller Case as reported in 603 Pacific Reporter, 2d, p. 817. 
It states, "...the necessity is for the condemnor and not for the 
courts to decide, and the decision of such condemnor is final as 
long as it acts reasonably and in good faith." 
The issues on which the condemnation could be contested 
were spelled out to you by the Court and opposing counsel but you 
refused to use these issues. The case you put on had no grounds, 
there was no foundation, and because of a lack of basis for your 
argument opposing counsel had a continuing objection to all 
evidence we put on as being irrelevant and the Court ruled in the 
opposing counsel's favor. We just as well not even been in Court. 
In fact, the record reveals: 
MR. MARTINEAU: IT'S OUR BURDEN TO MAKE A PRIMA FACIE 
CASS. I THINK IT'S YOUR BURDEN TO PROVE FRAUD OR THAT TYPE OF 
THING. 
THE COURT: THAT'S RIGHT. 
MR. PRESTON: YOUR HONOR, FOR THE RECORD I'M NOT 
ALLEGING FRAUD. DID YOU SAY FRAUD? 
MR. MARTINEAU: THAT, ALONG WITH AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR 
A WASTE OF PUBLIC FUNDS IS ONE OF THE GROUNDS, AND THAT'S NOT 
i cm 
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AN ISSUE HERE, I DON'T THINK. YOU HAVEN'T PLEADED IT AND I DON'T 
THINK IT IS AN ISSUE. 
MR. PRESTON: I WOULDN'T ACCUSE THESE GENTLEMAN OF 
FRAUD... 
If you remember, I disputed your argument of no fraud, no 
bad faith and not being arbitrary. I had given you a copy of State 
regulations pertaining to municipal culinary water systems. The 
State regs require a 25 year history of flows to be considered in 
the development of sources of water and the low flow of the period 
to be used as the criteria in determining the the validity of the 
source as a viable source. To this date the attorneys for Rollers 
have utterly failed to place before the Courts the regulations 
regarding municipal culinary water systems. Because you failed to 
lay this foundation the Judge would not hear the flow data I 
provided you from the Town's records. The Judge ruled it 
irrelevant. 
-Additionally, the State Regs define where the service 
connection or tap, or hook-up is located. You utterly failed to 
provide this information to the Court when the illegal motion was 
presented by Mr. Eurnett to the Court to move the location of the 
Hollers' 3/4 inch service tap. As I told you at the time, all the 
legal jargon you attorneys were embarking on was frivolous and only 
served to generate fees. The self-evident, physical fact is, the 
service connection or tap of the water user is where the water user 
connects to the line of the water supplier. 
The deeded contract Kollers have with the Town requires 
the Town to deliver water for human drinking purposes to Kollers at 
a specified location where the 3/4 inch service conncticn has 
always been located. The Town from the start of this long, 
expensive, legal journey has sought to dishonor that contract in 
BAD FAITH. You were invloved from the start and were well aware of 
this fact bur you have failed to plead the issue in this case. 
Further, there is fraud. The Town, their engineer and 
their Counsel has repeatedly sought to deceive the Courts, the 
State Health Department and all of us by using false data to show 
there was no nitrate in the Griffiths and Pearson Springs prior to 
1977 when Evan Koller moved to Cornish and suddenly contaminated 
those springs with nitrate. The fact is, uhere were no nitrate 
tests made of those springs prior to 1977. Kollers had farmed the 
area around the Pearson Spring since the mid 1940's and the 
Griffiths Spring since about 1970. You were given this info but 
you failed to use i":. 
There was and is a mountain of information showing fraud, 
bad faith, arbitrariness, violation of regulations and 
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statues and a waste of public funds but you have never laid a 
foundation for any action under these issues. 
And we have lost it badly, George. Maybe the legal 
system has won a bunch but the Kollers and Cornish Town have lost 
it badly. 
There is an issue you may want to get your teeth into or 
be interested in. I have tried to point it out to Byron Fisher but 
have had no response on rhe issue. It is as follows: 
I have a question regarding the queston of abandonment and the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of U.C.A. 78-34-2 which provides for 
"Estates and rights that may be taken." U.C.A. 78-34-2, (1) lists 
the purposes for which fee simple may be taken and then qualifies 
those purposes if there is mineral underlying the area to an 
easement only. A protection zone is not one of these purposes. 
U.C.A. 78-34-2, (2) states, "An easement, when taken for any other 
use." A protection zone fits into this classification-. 
The Town by letter to Mr. Koller stated in was "imperitive" that 
they have "fee simple" title to all the property they were taking. 
The fact is the Town was asking fee simple on all the property they 
were taking, r-o-w's and all, but the District Court pointed out 
they could not take fee simple to the r-o-w's but was going to 
allow it on the protection zones. At the end of the Occupancy 
Hearing when I prompted you to ask about oil rights and mineral 
rights Burnett stated that they needed fee simple and could not 
have oil rigs or such things on the property. 
The fact is the statute does not provide for the taking of 
protection zones in fee simple. Period! So they amended their 
complaint and asked for an easement only. Either they needed fee 
simple or they didn't. If they didn't they were acting in "bad 
faith" by seeking complete ownership of the property for purposes 
other than a protection zone. You should have caught this and 
explicted it at the hearing on occupancy. But you didn't and they 
were granted occupancy. 
Correspondence was introduced at trial showing Mr. Koller had asked 
the Town what rights they needed in the property and they had 
replied by letter it was "imperative" they have all rights or "fee 
simple". The Town was then confronted with a proffer of proof of 
minerals underlying the property. The Town then abondoned their 
need for fee simple and the need to restrict Kollers to steep, 
inaccessible, unuseable r-o-w's across the property and amended 
their complaint to needing an easement only because that was 
provided by statute. The fact is they abandoned 
George Preston 
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their claim because the law did not allow it to begin with under 
any circumstances and. The Court then erred in letting them take 
an easement without determining the value of the minerals 
underlying the property which minerals they could not afford to 
buy. 
They did not amend the claim from fee simple to an easement because 
the statute concerning minerals provides for an easement only as 
the Town or Supreme Court would have us believe. That portion of 
the statute does net apply in this case. This should be an issue 
for a re-hearing before the Supreme Court or for an appeal from 
their opinion. It is my view that the Town totally abandoned their 
claimed need position and sought a totally new position which the 
State Supreme Court has now ruled is also untennable. We should be 
entitled to costs and fees and particulary so if it can be 
demonstrated at trial that the Town has to buy the minerals. 
The thrust of the legal system at this point, and the Supreme Court 
implies it in the final paragraph of the their opinion on minerals, 
is that Kollers property rights are inferior to the Town's water 
rights. Therefore, there is a question whether Kollers can mine 
the mineral because the water rights prohibit such mining. I 
imagine another huge legal bill can be generated for both the Town 
and the Kollers over that litigation. The fact is, Kollers have a 
record of a patent to their property which makes it allodial and it 
predates any rights acquired by the Town to any water by many 
decades. But as long as the courts and legal system is giving away 
other peoples property and not their own they tend to have a pretty 
liberal view. That is the way I have viewed the action of the 
Democratic Party they are liberal until their personal pocketbook 
is pinched and then they are very conservative. It seems to depend 
on who's ox is being gored. 
There's more but a grain combine and a harvest crew has 
been waiting for me. 
I still feel the system should be liable for the costs if 
they want to play games and cause the proliferation of legal fees. 
It seems to me that is only right and you should have been trying 
to help us in that regard if you were really qualified counsel 
working in our behalf. You know George, Judges as well as 
attorneys can be sued. They are not above the law. It might put 
your next case before the Judge in jeopardy if you sue him but that 
is not your client's fault that is one of the things wrong with 
the legal system. I don't want to fight with you guys. But you 
should know by now that I will fight if I have to. Now you proceed 
as seems to you good. 
Sincerely yours, 
Evan 0. Koller 
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Evan Koller 
Dear Ray: 
I have received from the law firm of Preston & Chambers all of 
the billings concerning the various lawsuits when Mr. Preston 
represented Mr. and Mrs. Koller. These billings are at my office. 
If either you or Mr. Koller want to make arrangements to come 
review the billings, you are certainly welcome to. The other 
alternative is that we will provide to you copies of the billings 
for 2 0£ per page. There are a lot of billings for each case. The 
decision is yours. Please let me know whether you want to review 
the billings at my office or receive copies. 
Also, I sent to your office on June 22, 1992 an Acceptance of 
Service and Entry of Appearance. I have not received from you a 
signed original of that document. I have enclosed with this letter 
again an Acceptance of Service and Entry of Appearance. Please 
sign the original and return it to my office so that I may file it 
with the Court. I have been requested by my clients to conclude 
this matter as expeditiously as possible. Therefore, after you 
have signed the Acceptance, please answer the Complaint within 
twenty (20) days of the date of your Acceptance or a default 
judgment will be taken against Mr. Koller. If I have not received 
the Acceptance of Service and Entry of Appearance from you by 
September 4, 1992, I will proceed to have the Sheriff serve Mr. 
Koller. 
Sincerely yours, 
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1 I THE CLERK: Case number 93-019, Preston and 
2 I Chambers vs. Koller. Appearance of counsel for the 
3 record, please 
4 (Pause in the proceedings.) 
5 THE COURT: Can we have counsel make their 
6 appearances for the record. 
7 MR. HANNI: Glenn Hanni representing the 
8 plaintiffs . 
9 MR. MALOUF: Ray Malouf representing the 
10 defendant and counterclaimant, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: This is the time set for a hearing on 
12 the plaintiffs1 motion for partial summary judgment. 
13 Let me advise counsel of a couple of circumstances. I 
14 r apologize at the outset. I know it always frustrated 
15 me when I would prepare concise and well-researched 
16 memoranda and affidavits and then come to court and 
17 the hearing and found out the judge hadn't reviewed 
18 those . 
19 I looked at this file this morning for the 
20 first time. I didn't know I had it on my calendar. I 
21 think there's possibly 200 pages there. I've done 
22 some speed reading this morning between hearings, but 
23 I don't think I've reviewed more than half of what's 
24 there. I have reviewed all of the memoranda, but the 
25 exhibits and the affidavits and supporting 
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1 I documentation I've only partially worked through. 
2 I I'll go ahead and hear your arguments this 
3 I morning on that. I've got another hearings scheduled 
4 | at 11:30, but I tell you that simply so you'll 
5 I understand where I'm coming from. It's not likely 
6 that I'll be able to give you a decision this morning 
7 on the issue. Go ahead, Mr. Hanni . 
8 MR. HANNI: If it please the court, the hearing 
9 this morning is based on the plaintiffs' motion for 
10 partial summary judgment. Now, this lawsuit was filed 
11 in May of 1992. The defendant got served in October 
12 of 1992. It was a suit to recover attorney's fees. 
13 Mr. Roller, the defendant, has filed a 
14 counterclaim, claiming, among other things, that there 
15 is an accounting problem between the plaintiff and the 
16 defendant. That's not involved this morning. The 
17 only thing that's involved is the counterclaim 
18 involving claims of legal malpractice against Mr. 
19 P r e s t o n . 
2 0 N o w , the p l a i n t i f f has f i l e d a m o t i o n for 
21 summary judgment here. I shouldn't say the plaintiff, 
22 the defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment. 
23 That is not on for hearing this morning. It has not 
24 been responded to yet by Mr. Preston, but will be. 
25 There will be a timely response filed. 
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1 I questions. They're going to require expert testimony. 
2 I don't think this court is going to let a layman get 
3 up on that stand and tell a jury what a lawyer ought 
4 to do or not do under a complicated legal situation 
5 with a complicated factual background. I don't think 
6 this court is going to let a layman get up there and 
7 say that a lawyer deviated from the standard of care. 
8 We think that this case has been pending 
9 long enough. We have asked many times for the naming 
10 of an expert. The defendant has done absolutely 
11 nothing to try and find an expert. They've had lots 
12 of time and lots of requests. We submit that this 
13 case — the counterclaim should be dismissed. 
14 THE COCJRT: Counsel, I'm going to give you a 
15 partial ruling right now. I have read, as I've 
16 indicated, all of the memoranda. I have reviewed 
17 some, but not all, of the supporting documentation. 
18 As counsel have pointed out, there's certainly an 
19 abundance being provided. 
20 I want to make a couple of observations. 
21 It's been 34 months since the defendant's counterclaim 
22 was filed. 34 months. It's difficult for me to 
23 comprehend when the defendant and counsel were going 
24 to get around to having the case ready for trial. In 
25 other words, when one alleges malpractice, at some 
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1 point one has to have one's proof. Usually that's 
2 lined up at the time one makes one's allegations. 
3 I recognize that there's not a discovery 
4 cutoff, but even the eminent domain issue that counsel 
5 has cited, the statute you referred to, counsel, 
6 78-34-2, in the court's opinion requires a certain 
7 level of expertise possibly even beyond 50 percent of 
8 those who are licensed members of the Bar, who have no 
9 background whatsoever in condemnation, eminent domain, 
10 and wouldn't be qualified to address those issues even 
11 though they're licensed attorneys. So to suggest that 
12 it's so obvious that no attorney or expertise would be 
13 necessary is, in the court's mind, not credible. Even 
14 that illustration seems to me to make the point that 
15 the plaintiff has raised. 
16 I'm going to do the following- There has 
17 not been a discovery cutoff. I'm going to 
18 conditionally grant the request of plaintiff as 
19 follows: I will allow the defendant 60 days from 
20 today's date in which to not only obtain an expert, 
21 but also to make that expert available to be deposed 
22 by plaintiffs' counsel. That deposition has to occur 
23 within 60 days. If that is not done, the plaintiffs' 
24 motion is granted. 
25 If that occurs, I'll allow vou to revisit 
Page 2 0 <Z2C~ 
1 I these issues. I'm not going to go through the file at 
2 1 this point and read his 32 page affidavit, plus all 
3| the interrogatory answers and other things, and start 
4 1 identifying this issue doesn't need expertise, this 
5 one does, this one doesn't. I'm not going to get into 
6 that kind of exercise at this point. 
7 if the attorney is not retained, the 
8 expert is not retained, and the deposition given 
9 within 60 days, then the motion is granted. That 
10 still leaves the defendant ample opportunity to make 
11 his case. 
12 MR. MALOUF: Thank you, Your Honor. 
13 MR. PRESTON: Your Honor, the attorney that we've 
14 hired on attorney's fees, Tom Willmore, has filed in 
15 this court a notice of withdrawal. As a result, we 
16 will be representing ourselves on the case. 
17 With regards to the motion for summary 
18 disposition by Mr. Koller as it relates to attorney's 
19 fees, we will be making an appearance in court and 
20 would like an additional ten days to reply to that, if 
21 we may. 
22 THE COURT: Ten days from today's date? 
23 MR . PRESTON: Yes . 
24 THE COURT: I'll grant that. Has Mr. Willmore 
25 filed a notice of withdrawal? 
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MR. MALOUF: He has, Your Honor, some months ago 
THE COURT: All right. That will give you until 
have your response filed on or before September 
MR. PRESTON: Thank you. 
MR. HANNI: I'll prepare an order, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes, if you would, Mr. Hanni. Thank 
you 
(Concluded at 11:40 a.m.) 
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Defendant and ] 
Counterclaimant. 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 930000019 CV 
> Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
The motion of plaintiff for partial summary judgment 
on all legal malpractice claims asserted in defendant's counter-
claim came on for hearing before the Court on the 29th day of 
August, 1995. Plaintiff was represented by its attorney, 
Glenn C. Hanni of the firm of Strong & Hanni. Defendant was 
represented by his attorney, Raymond N. Malouf. The Court 
heard argument of counsel, and it appearing to the Court that 
the malpractice claims asserted in the counterclaim will require 
expert testimony, and it further appearing that defendant, having 
more than ample time to do so, has failed to designate an expert 
Addendum 4 
September 25, 1995 Order R 439.440 
to address the legal malpractice claims asserted in the 
counterclaim, and the Court being fully advised, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintifffs motion for partial summary judgment is 
hereby granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of 
plaintiff and against defendant on all legal malpractice claims 
asserted in the counterclaim unless the defendant on or before 
October 28, 1995, designates an expert witness or witnesses 
who will be prepared to express final opinions with respect to 
the legal malpractice claims involved in this case, and unless 
within said time the expert witness or witnesses are made 
available for their depositions to be taken by plaintiff. 
2. The deposition or depositions of defendant's expert 
witness or expert witnesses shall be completed within the time 
frame stated above. 
Dated this '££~ day of S^fl. , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
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Telephone (801) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C., 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant 
vs. 
EVAN O. ROLLER, 
Defendant and Counterclaimant. 
) DEFENDANT AND 
) COUNTERCLAIMANTS MOTION 
) FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO 
) PROVIDE EXPERT WITNESSES 
) Case No. 930000019 
) Honorable Ben H. Hadfield 
COMES NOW the Defendant and Counterclaimant, Evan O. Roller, 
through counsel, and moves that the Court Order an extension of 
time beyond October 28, 1995 to designate an expert witness or 
expert witnesses who will be prepared to express opinions 
regarding legal malpractice claims stated in the Counterclaim. 
Defendant moves that the Court enter an Ex Parte Order for a 
temporary extension until such time as this Motion is heard. 
This Motion is supported by the pleadings in the file, made 
after the matter was heard in argument August 29, 19 95, which 
have been numerous. It is also supported by the Memorandum 
submitted herewith and Affidavits. 
DATED this 24th day of October, 1995. 
Addendum 5 
Extension of Time Motion R 499 
Memorandum R 501 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of October, 1995, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing, Defendant and 
Counterclaimant's Motion for Extension of Time to Provide Expert 
Witnesses, was mail€>d postage prepaid to the following: 
Glenn C, Hanni 
Peter H. Christensen 
Attorney at Law 
6th Floor Boston Building 
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MALOUF LAW OFFICE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
150 East 200 North #D 
Logan, UT 84321-4036 
Telephone (801) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
\r*> 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant 
vs. 
EVAN O. KOLLER, 
Defendant and Counterclaimant 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF 
TIME 
Case No. 930000019 
Honorable Ben H. Hadfield 
Defendant and Counterclaimant, Evan Roller filed a Motion 
for an Extension of Time to provide an expert or experts with 
opinions respecting the allegations of malpractice against 
Plaintiff George Preston. In support of this Motion, Defendant 
provides the following Memorandum: 
PLEADINGS FILED AFTER AUGUST 29, 1995 
The pleadings filed after this matter was heard August 29, 
1995 show that there are more issues to be resolved by the Court 
than the Court had before it August 29. On August 29, the Court 
only considered the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment against Defendant's malpractice claims. Now the Court 
has pending, and to be heard, Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff's accounting and also 
respecting the jurisdiction of the Court on the Complaint. In 
addition, the Plaintiff filed the third Motion for Partial 
OCT 25 wf^i 
is progressing as fast as reasonable—but it cannot be ready by 
October 28. 
In addition, the Defendant is consulting with an accounting 
firm to review Plaintiff billings. Their opinions are similarly 
not formed yet because of the necessity of imputing data. 
It is reasonable and equitable that the Defendant be allowed 
an extension of time because of progress made in order to provide 
experts. 
OUTSTANDING DISCOVERY 
As the Court may recall, the Court has yet to have a Pre-
Trial Conference to enter a discovery cut-off date. After August 
29, Roller submitted his Second Interrogatories to the Plaintiff. 
Answers were just received. Roller's Third Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents were served October 9, 1995. 
Answers are not yet due. The Third Interrogatories refer to 
specific requests for files each party has that the other has not 
yet reviewed. 
OTHER MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
merits of the accounting is appropriate to dismiss the Complaint. 
This is true notwithstanding the recitation of 23 factual issues 
referred to in Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Counter-Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on Defendant's Counterclaim, served October 11, 
1995. These facts show that the Defendant is entitled to Partial 
Summary Judgment against Plaintiff's initial Complaint because 
3 
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Defendant paid at least $11,669.78 more than the Complaint. 
Defendant is not, however, asking for Partial Summary Judgment on 
certain over-charges. These will increase the amount of 
Defendant's overpayment. The material factual disputes about the 
Plaintiff's malpractice are set forth in the afore-referenced 
Memorandum on Pages 13 through 24. The Defendant is entitled to 
the benefit of the presumption that there are material disputed 
facts about which not only an expert can testify, but also the 
Defendant himself may testify to the particular events stated in 
Evan Roller's October 11, 1995 Affidavit. 
CONCLUSION 
Granting the Defendant more time to provide experts, given 
the status of this case, is fair, equitable, and will be more 
legally efficient. A Temporary Order extending the time should 
also be granted. 
DATED this 24th day of October, JT9^ST-N 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of October, 1995, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing, Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Extension of Time, was mailed postage prepaid to the 
following; 
Glenn C. Hanni 
Peter H. Christensen 
Attorney at Law 
6th Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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MALOUF LAW OFFICE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
150 East 200 North #D 
Logan, UT 84321-4036 
Telephone (801) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C., 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant 
vs. 
EVAN O. KOLLER, 
Defendant and Counterclaimant. 
) AFFIDAVIT OF EVAN O. KOLLER 
) (OCTOBER 24, 1995) 
) Case No. 930000019 
) Honorable Ben H. Hadfield 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF CACHE) 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Evan O. Roller, and states the 
following of his own personal knowledge: 
1. I am the Defendant and Counterclaimant in this action. 
2. I have diligently sought to comply with the Court's 
order given from the bench on the 29th day of August, 1995 which 
order requires experts to testify in this matter. 
3. I called a number of attorneys and auditors in an 
effort to find experts who had the time and were qualified in the 
particular areas. 
4. Many days have been spent identifying, preparing and 
copying documents of the case to take to a number of those 
called. The documents in this case are voluminous. 
r,^U 9 5 - Q\°\ 
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5. At the present time the auditing firm of Pinnock 
Robbins Posey & Richins is examining the billing statements of 
the Plaintiff. They have indicated they cannot finish the work 
in the time allotted. 
6. The law firm of Nielsen & Senior is examining documents 
of the case. They have indicated they cannot be prepared to 
proceed in the time allotted. 
7. The law firm of Jeffrey W. Appel is also examining 
documents of the case. Attorney Appel has indicated he cannot be 
prepared to proceed in the time allotted. 
8. The order of the Court came during our harvest season 
in which I was engaged from early morning until late at night 
until September 29, 1995. After that I had to get the fall wheat 
seeded. In addition there have been field trips with water 
rights attorneys in Idaho regarding water right filings. There 
have been field trips with Idaho Fish & Game regarding wildlife 
damage. Field trips and meetings have been required with 
geologists who were examining the area. A canal company called 
and needed several days help in breaking and loading old sugar 
factory foundations to be used as rip-rap in their system. In 
addition to all this there have been all the day-to-day problems 
and people that have to be accommodated or serviced. The demands 
have been more than I can cope with. There is much farm work 
that has been abandoned because of a lack of time. It will be 
expensive for us. 
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9. I have spent four days in Salt Lake City contacting 
experts and working with them to comply with the order of the 
Court. I have been unable to move this any faster. I will try 
and expedite it as fast as I can but the experts are the ones 
that will have to indicate when they are, or can be prepared. 
10. In view of the above circumstances, I am compelled to 
ask the Court for an extension of time. It will take time for 
the experts to become prepared and it will take time to schedule 
and take the depositions. Without further direction from the 
experts, I would suggest a 30 day extension. 
DATED this 24th day of October, 1995. 
EVAN O. KOLLER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of October, 
1995, by Evan 0. Roller. 
MICHELLE F. JA6GI 
m m PUBLIC'STATE OF UTM 
150 EAST 200 NORTH « 
LOGAN, UTAH 84321 
COMM. EXP. MAY 7,1997 
J ^ ^ K - ^ C T 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of October, 1995, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing, Affidavit of Evan Roller, 
was mailed postage prepaid to the following: 
Glenn C. Hanni 
Peter H. Christensen 
Attorney at Law 
6th Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Secretary 
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MALOUF LAW OFFICES 
CARL E. MALOUF 
RAYMOND N. MALOUF 
MICHAEL W. IsBELL 
DAVID L. COOLEY 
Also admitted in F lor ida 
150 EAST 2 0 0 NORTH, SUITE D 
LOGAN, UTAH 8 4 3 2 1 - 4 0 3 6 
PHONE ( 8 0 1 ) 7 5 2 - 9 3 8 0 
FAX ( 8 0 1 ) 7 5 2 - 9 ^ 3 2 
October 24, 1995 
Honorable Ben H. Hadfield 
First District Court 
140 North 100 West 
Logan, UT 84321 
Re: Preston & Chambers v. Roller, #930000019 
Dear Judge Hadfield: 
Evan Roller is filing a Motion for an extension of time to 
provide an expert or experts. He requests an Ex Parte Order 
extending the time beyond October 28 for Evan Roller to designate 
an expert witness or witnesses and to have those witnesses 
available to express opinion, until the Motion is heard and ruled on 
by the Court. The Motion is supported by a Memorandum, as well as 
the numerous pleadings filed after this Motion for Summary 
Judgment. You also have two more Motions for Summary Judgment 
before you which need to be heard. 
Instead of one Motion for Summary Judgment before the Court as 
was the case August 29, there is also a Motion for Summary Judgment 
on behalf of the Defendant for a judgment on the accounting and 
dismissing the Complaint. There is a third Motion, filed on behalf 
of the Plaintiff, for judgment on account stated. Memoranda are 
filed on all these, and the latter two should be set for a hearing. 
Resolving the Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant's legal 
malpractice claims (first Motion) does not resolve the case. A 54b 
Order may be needed if all issues cannot be decided. On the other 
hand, extending the existing deadline and keeping the case open on 
all issues is appropriate, because (a) the progress Defendant is 
making in getting an expert or experts despite time problems; (b) 
the inter-relationship between malpractice and the billings which 
must eventually be heard anyway because the existing Order does not 
solve accounting problems; (c) the fact that discovery has not 
terminated; and (d) the fact that Defendant still has one 
outstanding discovery request. Defendant submitted two discovery 
requests after August 29, 1995. The Plaintiff has responded to one 
and the other may provide additional information which could be 
necessary for an expert's review. 
Si^r^rely^ypurs, 
RNM:by 




Raymond N. Malouf (#2067) d:affappei.rbp 
MALOUF LAW OFFICES „ .., , _ r • -. 
Attorneys for Defendant u l , L l 
150 East 200 North #D 
Logan, Utah 84321-4036 
Telephone (801) 752-9380 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C., ) AFFIDAVIT OF 




EVAN O. KOLLER, ) Case No. 930000019 CV 
Defendant and Counterclaimant. ) Honorable Ben H. Hadfield 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
The undersigned attorney deposes and states the following of 
his own personal knowledge: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of 
Utah. A major portion of my practice is devoted to the areas of 
water law and litigation. 
2. I have been retained on behalf of Evan O. Koller to 
furnish legal opinions concerning certain claims of malpractice 
Defendant and Counterclaimant Koller made against Attorney George 
W. Preston, the Plaintiff in this action. The parties will 
hereafter be referred to as "Preston" and "Koller". 
3. To date, I have reviewed certain documentation and 
summaries provided to me on behalf of Koller. 
4. The Counterclaim (Paragraph 5) alleged that Preston was 
confused about several of the issues, was negligent in-aome^^f^his ,q 
Addendum 6 
Jeffrey W. Appel Affidavit R 587-594 ^ ^ 
legal work, and to the extent he was, Preston should not be 
compensated. 
5. Having reviewed certain excerpts from the 1983 trial 
testimony, it appears to me that Preston was confused concerning 
the difference between appropriative water rights under State law 
and contract rights provided by the Deed to Roller. However, the 
Judge appeared to understand the water rights. To the extent 
Preston failed to prepare pleadings after the trial to place the 
location of delivery of water to Roller as found by the Court, 
failed to avoid pressing for a gallons-per-minute limitation on the 
deeded water right to Roller, and did not differentiate between 
appropriated versus contract water rights, Preston did not meet the 
duty of care owed to his client. 
6. Roller has specifically alleged that Preston failed to 
adequately prepare, complete, and follow-up with proper Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree, in the original 1983 
case before Judge Christopherson. To the extent the Court's 
statements were not embodied within the written Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment entered by the Trial Court, the 
duty of care was not met. 
7. Any failure to include important information in the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at the Trial Court 
level, particularly when the Trial Court appeared to understand 
appropriative water rights and contract rights, would create 
ramifications in the first appeal. 
8. Roller claims Preston failed to adequately put into 
evidence the Utah State Safe Drinking Water Regulations. It is my 
opinion that a preferable strategic choice would have been to 
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advise the Court of the existence of these regulations in an 
attempt to convince the Court the Town of Cornish had the 
obligation to provide water fit for human drinking purposes to 
Roller pursuant to the Deeds. To the extent Preston failed to put 
community drinking regulations into evidence as an obligation of 
Cornish, he probably failed in the duty he owed to Roller in that 
case. 
9. Time has not permitted me to become fully immersed in all 
of the evidence and the transcripts to provide final opinions, so 
my use of "probably" is intentional. There is a genuine concern 
about choices made to not present this evidence. Those choices 
appear, now, to be a failure to meet the duty of care owed to the 
Rollers. 
10. After the Supreme Court decision in Cache County Case 
18267 on July 20, 1988 (No. 19981), it was necessary to prepare 
Amended Findings, Conclusions, and a Judgment. Preston and Roller 
apparently disagreed about the amount of detail and the language to 
be inserted in the Amended Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment. 
Roller is still asserting there are errors and omissions in those 
amended documents. The Trial Court had a hearing November 15, 
1988. The attorney for Cornish City made a motion to change the 
location for the 3/4-inch connection to the Roller home. 
11. Roller is asserting that Preston was unprepared November 
15, 1988 to convince the Trial Court and respond to the motion to 
move the 3/4-inch connection tee to a new location, which had zero 
water pressure. The Trial Court ruled against Mr. Roller on this 
motion, necessitating another appeal to the Supreme Court, in which 
the Trial Court was reversed. The Trial Court signed its Order 
3 
December 15, 1988. Copies of the town's Amended Findings, 
Conclusions and Order were mailed to Preston November 30, 1988. 
Preston filed written objections to the decision of the Trial 
Court, December 15, too late to be timely. The issue of the water 
tap connection location was not part of the first appeal. 
12. To the extent Preston was late in objecting to the Order 
of the Trial Court concerning Cornish City's motion, a fairly 
serious problem was created. From what I understand at this level, 
it appears the tap connection issue could have been effectively 
cured at the Trial Court level. The second Utah Supreme Court 
opinion (No. 890020, September 19, 1990) corrected the Trial Court. 
My preliminary opinion is that Preston failed in the duty of care 
he owed to Roller by making the objections late. 
13. Roller asked Preston to file a civil rights lawsuit 
against Cornish Town and its town council for deceptively 
attempting to take Roller property rights by falsely alleging 
Roller polluted the springs with nitrogen fertilizers. Roller was 
not happy with the way this case was prosecuted, and it was finally 
settled. Questions about prosecution of this case are more fact 
sensitive, and I am not able to express an opinion at this time. 
Roller has alleged there were conflicts of interest, an example of 
which is that somehow Cornish Town became aware of the imminent 
filing of the civil rights suit. If Roller asked Preston whether 
there were conflicts of interest and did not get a complete answer, 
or if there were real conflicts, there is a legitimate problem with 
failure to disclose conflicts of interest for which there is a duty 
of care owed to the client. I am not yet able to express an 
opinion about whether Preston should have pushed earlier and harder 
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for discovery of the fraudulent documents relating to the 
condemnation of land to secure water issues. 
14. Roller alleged Preston failed to appropriately contest 
Cornish Town's condemnation proceeding. The condemnation was 
attempted under U.C.A. §78-34-1 et seg. Roller has asserted that 
statute did not allow the taking of protection zones by taking fee 
title to real property, and that the failure to allege this in 
Court was a failure of the duty of care owed to Roller by Preston. 
Roller claims that Roller unnecessarily had to hire a mineral 
expert and pay the fees and expenses to assess mineral values, and 
to pay Preston's fees for interviewing and becoming knowledgeable 
about the mineral value of the property. Roller claims this could 
have been avoided had Preston simply been prepared to argue that 
fee title was not available, when the Court had a hearing October 
10, 1986. Roller alleges that it was he, rather than Preston, that 
introduced the subject to challenge a taking of all interests in 
the property, as opposed to a lesser interest for the protection 
zone. 
15. It is quite clear that fee title may not be taken under 
U.C.A. §78-34-2 for the purposes sought by Cornish Town. Preston's 
failure to understand and enunciate that defense, to the extent he 
did not, was a failure in meeting the duty owed to his client. It 
is my preliminary opinion that proper assertion might have obtained 
the desired result much earlier in the proceedings and probably 
even during that hearing. Only later did the town apparently amend 
its request and not seek to buy the minerals. It accepted an 
easement only. To the extent Preston did not raise the issues 
Roller requested, it appears the duty to Roller was not met. 
5 
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16. Koller asserted that Preston should have been forthright 
in alleging fraud against Cornish Town, but did not do so because 
he either did not proceed properly with discovery to bolster the 
fraud charge, or because he had conflicts of interest. I have not 
had sufficient time to review materials to determine if Preston had 
documents in his possession that would have shown fraud, or if he 
should have requested items which would have led to the production 
of those documents. I have seen documents now available that 
support Roller's beliefs about Cornish Town fraud. If Preston had 
such documents, he likely could have made a prima facie case for 
fraud, which would also have shortened proceedings following and in 
connection with the October 10, 1986 hearing on condemnation. To 
the extent Koller pointed out matters and Preston ignored him, 
Preston would likely not have been meeting his duty of care to 
Koller. 
17. Koller has stated he obtained Cornish minutes and other 
information from the Bear River Association of Governments 
(B.R.A.G.) file which proves the fraud by Cornish City. Preston 
did not directly obtain this information. When Preston went to the 
B.R.A.G. offices to get the file on Cornish, very few (and 
unimportant according to Koller) records were found. According to 
Koller, when Koller went unannounced to B.R.A.G. offices, Koller 
obtained a host of very important documents, but this ended up 
being years too late. Koller obtained the materials March 28, 
1986. The minutes would have been very helpful, according to 
Koller, even in the initial trial in 1983. 
18. Koller alleges that Preston had conflicts of interest 
that interfered with a zealous representation of the Rollers 
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(Paragraph 9 of the Counterclaim) . The conflicts appear to be that 
Preston's firm was general counsel for Lewiston State Bank, at 
which the Cornish Town mayor Verl Buxton was a major stockholder; 
Preston's law firm has stock in the local bank; Preston's firm also 
was local counsel for two other major Utah banks; one of the 
councilmen in Cornish was also a client of Preston; Preston asked 
Roller to voluntarily drop Cornish Town officer A.J. Simmonds from 
the civil rights lawsuit, even though the Cornish minutes reflected 
that A.J. Simmonds encouraged lawsuits against Roller; Cornish City 
had interaction with Bear River Association of Governments 
(B.R.A.G.) in the condemnation lawsuit against Roller; the director 
of B.R.A.G., Bruce Ring, was apparently a client of Preston; and 
Preston asked Roller to drop Bear River Association of Governments 
from the related civil rights lawsuit. 
19. These apparent conflicts of interest would become an 
issue of adequate disclosure to the client. If Preston felt that 
the ability to represent Roller was compromised by Preston's 
friendships or associations with others, the law firm had a duty to 
advise Roller, discuss the matter, and offer to terminate 
representation if necessary. The conflict of interest question is 
factually intensive. Although it appears there were conflicts, it 
could remain for trial and testimony from Preston and Roller to 
reveal the amount of disclosure, at the time, on these specific 
conflicts, to know whether the duty of care was breached. 
CONCLUSION 
20. It appears to me that Preston made some mistakes 
concerning the condemnation and water rights aspects of the case. 
Had I been in charge of this case, I would have better 
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differentiated between the appropriative and contract water rights 
and likely would have taken the steps to assure the quality of the 
water for Roller by apprising the Court of the drinking water 
regulations. 
21. Without knowing more about the state of the discovery at 
the time, it is difficult to ascertain if I would have raised fraud 
or misuse of public funds at the time of the condemnation 
proceedings by Cornish against Roller. I would, however, have 
reviewed the statute and noticed early on that fee title is 
unavailable to the condemnor under the statute. 
22. With respect to the conflicts of interest, if I had 
conflicts, I would immediately disclose them to my client and let 
him make the decision concerning continued representation. 
23. I am mindful of the advantage to the "Monday-morning 
quarterback" and the benefits of 20-20 hindsight. However, there 
seem to have been lapses of judgment by Preston that show failure 
to meet his duties to Roller. Immersion in the transcripts and 
additional documents is still required to reach ultimate 
conclusions thereon. 
DATED this H ^ day of December, 1995. 
J&FFJgCEV fa Y APPEL / ' 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this \H day of December, 
1995, by Jeffrey W. Appel. 
(Seal! 
Notary Public J 






IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C. ) 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) Civil No. 930000019 CV 
VS. 
) JUDGE: BEN H. HADFIELD 
EVAN O. ROLLER, 
Defendant and Counterclaimant. ) 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to various motions filed by the parties. The 
Court will address them as follows: 
I. 
This Court entered its partial summary judgment on September 25, 1995. That order 
provided in part as follows: 
1. "Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby granted and 
judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant 
on all legal malpractice claims asserted in the counterclaim unless the 
Defendant on or before October 28, 1995 designates an expert witness or 
witnesses who will be prepared to express final opinions with respect to 
the legal malpractice claims involved in this case and unless, within said 
time, the expert witness or witnesses are made available for their depositions 
to be taken by Plaintiff." 
On October 24, 1995, the Defendant filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Provide 
Expert Witnesses. The motion was accompanied by a memorandum and affidavit and also 
included an Ex Parte Order to Extend Time. On October 27, 1995, the Court denied the 
Defendant's Ex Parte Order to Extend Time. 
Defendant now requests a hearing on the underlying Motion for Extension of Time. 
Plaintiff has objected to said hearing. The Court has reviewed the memorandum filed by 
both Defendant and Plaintiff. On August 29, 1995, the Court was explicit to the Defendant, 
that the deadline set by the Court must be met. The Court finds nothing in the Defendant's 
argument which is persuasive that the deadline as set by the Court should be altered in any 
manner. The efforts which Defendant claims to have made in procuring the expert witness 
are at best weak. Plaintiffs Counsel correctly points out that the Court has already denied 
the Ex Parte Order to Extend Time, the deadline has passed, and a hearing on the issue is 
now moot. Both sides acknowledge that Defendant did not meet the deadline. 
Addendum 7 
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The Motion to Extend Time is denied and has previously been denied. Defendant has 
had (3) three years in which to obtain an expert and failed to do so even during the (60) sixty 
day grace period granted by the Court. Therefore, pursuant to the partial summary judgment 
entered by this Court on September 25, 1995, all legal malpractice claims asserted in the 
counterclaim are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
II. 
The Defendant has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff. The motion 
is, in part, a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Defendant argues that the 
summons was not served within the times specified by rules of court and that therefore the 
action should be dismissed. Rule 4 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, addresses time 
of service and specifies that the summons and complaint shall be served, "no later than 120 
days after the filing of the complaint, unless the Court allows a longer period of time for 
good cause shown." 
It is undisputed that the Court has neither been asked nor allocated a longer period of 
time. The file reflects that the complaint was filed May 12, 1992. The summons was issued 
October 14, 1992, and served October 21, 1992. There appears to be a period of 161 days 
between filing of the complaint and service of the summons and complaint. Therefore, on its 
face, it would appear that the service was invalid and that the Plaintiffs complaint should be 
dismissed without prejudice. 
A difficulty arises in that Defendant has filed a counterclaim herein, thereby seeking 
relief from this Court through these proceedings. Defendant finds himself in the 
contradictory position of asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction, while simultaneously 
requesting this Court to enter a substantial judgment in favor of Defendant and against 
Plaintiff on the counterclaim. If jurisdiction does not exist, neither claim could succeed. 
The Court has reviewed the counterclaim of the Defendant. The pleading is far from 
clear and concise. It appears to the Court that the thrust of the counterclaim is a cause of 
action for legal malpractice. Potential other causes of action are hinted, although the 
elements of such causes of action are not plainly pled. Pursuant to the Courts' decision 
under Section ( I ) herein, all claims of Defendant for legal malpractice are now dismissed. 
The Court will allow the Defendant (14) fourteen days in which to file with the Court a 
document acknowledging that no other causes of action are stated or asserted through the 
counterclaim. If such a document is received from the Defendant, the record will then be 
clear that there are no counterclaims pending from Defendant against the Plaintiff. Under 
those circumstances, the Court would find no bar to granting the relief requested by 
Defendant and pursuant to Rule 4 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiffs 
complaint will be dismissed without prejudice. 
Page 3 
Memorandum Decision 
Civil No. 930000019 CV 
III. 
The Court recognizes there are other issues and motions pending in this action. In 
light of the Courts' rulings in the previous paragraphs, there may no longer be any pending 
causes of action in behalf of either Plaintiff or Defendant. For this reason, the Court 
reserves ruling on any further motions, pending a determination as to whether Defendant 
asserts additional causes of action in his counterclaim. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff is requested to prepare an Order in conformance herewith. 
DATED this 2 2^ day of November, 1995. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the ^ x l day of //C> . /C/Q5 , I sent by first class 
mail, a true and correct copy of the attached document to the following: 
Raymond N. Malouf 
Attorney at Law 
150 East 200 North, #D 
Logan, UT 84321-4036 
Glenn C. Hanni 
Peter H. Christensen 
Attorneys at Law 
6th Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
George W. Preston 
Attorney at Law 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, UT 84321 
District Court Clerk 
Deputy Court Clerk 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C. 
PLAINTIFF, 
vs. 
EVAN O. KOLLER, 
DEFENDANT. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 930 - 19 DC 
HONORABLE BEN H. HADFIELD 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion For New 
Trial, Motion To Reconsider, and Alternate Motion For Rule 54b Certification. The Court 
has reviewed the motion together with accompanying memorandum and supporting 
documents, the Plaintiffs' opposing memorandum, and the Defendant's reply memorandum. 
After considering all of the materials submitted, the Defendant's Motion For New 
Trial and Motion To Reconsider are denied. The Court knows of no rule authorizing a 
Motion To Reconsider, but has in any event reviewed all of the submitted materials. No 
new arguments have been presented, only expanded versions of the previous arguments. 
Defendant's counsel seems to believe that the relevant issue is whether Defendant Koller 
knew for three years that he must obtain an expert. That inquiry is misdirected. Under the 
law, Mr. Koller should have known for the past three years that he must obtain an expert. 
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Aside from this, the record is crystal clear that the Court's Order of September 25, 
1995 and the Court's pronouncement from the bench on August 29, 1995 required Defendant 
to produce his expert for deposition by October 28, 1995. This the Defendant failed to do. 
With regards to the Motion For Rule 54b Certificate, it is tie Court's belief that the 
September 25, 1995 Order met the requirements of Rule 54b. However, to remove any 
question on this issue, the Coun directs Plaintiffs counsel to prepare a proposed Order Of 
Dismissal specifically tracking the language of Rule 54b. 
The Court has given serious consideration to an award of attorneys fees under Rule 
11. However, in view of all of the circumstances, the Court declines to grant Plaintiffs 
Motion For Sanctions in this regard. Counsel for Plaintiff is directed to prepare an Order in 
conformance herewith. 
DATED this JT^day of February, 1996. 
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This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Plaintiff's Renewed Motion For Decision 
dated December 27, 1995. The Plaintiff is seeking a decision concerning Plaintiff's Motion For 
Summary Judgment and Defendant seeks a dismissal. 
I. 
The Court has reviewed this file including specifically paragraph II of the Memorandum 
Decision dated November 22, 1995. The Defendant has failed to file with the Court any type of 
document acknowledging that no other causes of action are asserted. The Defendant has, pursuant to 
his motion, requested that the Complaint be dismissed pursuant to Rule 4(b) for lack of jurisdiction. 
The facts concerning that issue appear uncontested. Service of the Summons and Complaint were not 
obtained upon the Defendant with 120 days after filing of the Complaint. However, Defendant's 
counterclaim acknowledges and confers jurisdiction, his protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. 
The Defendant's Motion To Dismiss is therefore denied. 
II. 
-\,f : • """ : 
The Court has reviewed the Plaintiff's renewed Motion For Decision Concerning Summary 
Judgment and has also reviewed the Affidavit supplemental to Plaintiff's Motion For Summary 
Judgment, which Affidavit is dated December 27, 1995. The Court has reviewed the Defendant's 
92-Ml 
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response and also the referenced Affidavit filed by Defendant and dated October 11, 1995. The 
Affidavits attempt to provide an exhaustive tracking of the financial dealings of these parties for over 
15 years. It appears clear that there are disputed issues of material facts. The Motion For Summary 
Judgment is therefore denied. 
The Court has reviewed, in detail, the various allegations of the parties as set forth in the 
Affidavits. The presentation of evidence on these issues at trial will be both exhaustive and 
exhausting. There can be no question but that Plaintiff has expended more than $5,000 in billable 
time in pursuing this litigation. There is little possibility that Plaintiff will recover attorneys fees for 
this time expended. Taking this matter to trial may double the amount of attorneys time expended by 
Plaintiff. 
There can likewise be no question but that Defendant has already expended more in legal fees 
in this duel than the principal amount originally sought in Plaintiffs' Complaint. It is probable that 
these fees will double before the trial is concluded and similarly remote that Defendant will recover 
his attorneys fees expended herein. 
The parties ought to seriously consider whether it is time for reason to prevail. 
DATED this 2 I day of February, 1996. 
Ben H. Hadfield T 
District Judge / 
